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sity Press. LECTURE I: THE NORMATIVE  QUESTION 
Introduction 
In 1625, in his  book  On the Law  of  War and Peace, Hugo 
Grotius asserted that human beings would have obligations “even 
if  we should concede that which  cannot be conceded without the 
utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men 
are of no concern to Him.”1 But two of his followers, Thomas 
Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf, thought that Grotius was wrong. 
However socially useful moral conduct might be, they argued, it is 
not really  obligatory unless  some sovereign authority, backed  by 
the power of sanctions, lays it down as the law.2 Others in turn 
disagreed with them, and so the argument began. 
Ever since then, modern moral philosophers have been engaged 
in a debate about the “foundations” of  morality.  We  need to be 
shown, it is often urged, that morality is  “objective.”  The early 
rationalists,  Samuel Clarke and Richard  Price, thought that they 
knew exactly what they meant by this.3 Hobbes had said that there 
is no right or wrong in the state of  nature, and to them, this im- 
plied  that rightness  is  mere  invention  or convention, not some- 
thing Hobbes meant that individuals are not obligated to 
obey the laws of social cooperation in the absence of a sovereign 
who can impose them on everyone.5 But the rationalists took him 
Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Schneewind I, p. 92. I owe a great 
debt to  Jerome Schneewind for drawing my attention  to this stretch of  the historical 
debate, and especially for encouraging me to read Pufendorf. 
2. See Hobbes, especially Leviathan; and Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and 
of Nations and On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law. 
3 See Clarke, A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural 
Religion, and  the Truth and  Certainty  of  the Christian Revelation:  The Boyle  Lec- 
tures 1705; and Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals. 
4 Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.13, p. 90. 
5 Ibid., 1.15, p. 110. 22  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
to mean what Bernard  Mandeville had later ironically  asserted: 
that virtue  is  just an invention of  politicians, used  to keep their 
human cattle in line.6
But what exactly is the problem with that? Showing that some- 
thing is an invention is not a way of showing that it is not real. 
Moral standards exist, one might reply, in the only way standards 
of conduct can exist: people believe in such standards and there- 
fore regulate their conduct in accordance with them. Nor are these 
facts difficult to explain.  We  all know in a general way how and 
why we were taught to follow moral rules and that it would be 
impossible for us  to get on together  if  we didn’t do something 
along these lines.  We are social animals, and probably the whole 
thing has a biological basis.  So what’s missing here, that makes us 
seek a philosophical “foundation”  ? 
The answer lies in the fact that ethical standards are norma- 
tive. They do not merely describe a way in which we in fact regu- 
late our conduct. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, 
recommend, or guide. Or at least, when we invoke them, we make 
claims on one another.  When I say that an action is right I am 
saying that you ought to do it; when I say that something is good 
I am recommending it as worthy of your choice.  The same is true 
of the other concepts for which we seek philosophical foundations. 
Concepts like knowledge,  beauty, and meaning, as well as virtue 
and justice, all have a normative dimension, for they tell us what 
to think, what to  like, what to say, what to do, and what to be. 
And it is the force of  these normative claims -  the right of these 
concepts to give laws to us -  that we want to understand. 
And in ethics, the question can become urgent, for the day will 
come, for most of us, when what morality commands, obliges, or 
recommends  is hard: that we share decisions with people whose 
6 See Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits, 
especially the section “An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” pp. 41–57. 
Mandeville  himself  denied  that he  meant  either  that virtue  is  unreal  or that  it  is 
not worth having. See for instance “A Vindication of the Book,” pp. 384ff.; and 
also An Enquiry into the Origin of Honor, Schneewind II, pp. 396-98. [KORSGAARD]    The Sources of Normativity 23 
intelligence and integrity don’t inspire our confidence; that we 
assume grave responsibilities to which we feel inadequate; that we 
sacrifice our lives or voluntarily relinquish what makes them sweet. 
And  then  the  question  why?  will  press,  and rightly  so.  Why 
should I be moral?  This is  not, as H. A. Prichard  supposed, a 
misguided request for a demonstration  that morality is in our in- 
terest (although that may be one answer to the question)  .7  It is 
a call for philosophy, the examination of life.  Even those who are 
convinced that “it is right” must be in itself a sufficient reason for 
action may request an account of rightness that this conviction will 
survive.  The trouble with a view like Mandeville’s is not that it is 
not a reasonable explanation of  how moral practices came about, 
but rather that our commitment to these practices would not sur- 
vive our belief that it was  true.8  Why give up your heart’s desire, 
just because some politician wants to keep you in line? When we 
seek a philosophical  foundation for morality we are not looking 
merely for an explanation of moral practices.  We are asking what 
justifies the claims that morality makes on us.  This is what I will 
call “the normative question.” 
Now it is often thought that the normative question poses a 
special  problem  for  modern  moral  philosophers.  The Modern 
Scientific World  View  is  supposed  to  be  somehow  inimical  to 
ethics, while, in different ways, the teleological metaphysics of the 
the ancient  Greek  world  and the  religious  systems of  medieval 
Europe seemed friendlier to the subject.  It is a little hard to put 
the point clearly and in a way that does not give rise to obvious 
objections, but both of these earlier outlooks seem to support the 
idea that human life has a purpose that is or only can be fulfilled 
7 Prichard,  “Does Moral  Philosophy  Rest  on  a Mistake?” and  “Duty  and  In- 
terest.”  Prichard’s argument is discussed in detail below. 
8 Actually,  as  Hume and Hutcheson both argued, there are also problems about 
the  explanatory  adequacy  of  Mandeville’s  view.  For  Hume’s  discussion,  see  the 
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), p. 214. For Hutcheson’s, see 
the Inquiry concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), 
Raphael I, p. 291. Neither Hume nor Hutcheson names Mandeville, but he is clearly 
their target. 24  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
by those who live up to ethical standards and meet moral demands. 
And this is supposed to be sufficient to establish that ethics is really 
normative, that its demands on us are justified.  They are justified 
in the name of life’s purpose.  The Modern Scientific World View, 
in depriving us of the idea that the world has a purpose, has taken 
this justification away. 
Whether this is true or not, the moral philosophy of  the mod- 
ern period can be read as a search for the source of normativity. 
Philosophers in the modern period have come up with four suc- 
cessive answers to the question of what makes morality normative. 
In brief, they are these: 
(1)  Voluntarism.  According  to  this  view,  moral  obligation 
derives  from  the command  of  someone who  has  legitimate  au- 
thority over the moral agent and so can make laws for her.  You 
must do the right thing because God commands it, say, or because 
a political sovereign whom you have agreed to obey makes it law. 
Normativity springs from a legislative will.  This is the view of 
Pufendorf and of Hobbes. 
(2) Realism.  According to this view, moral claims are norma- 
tive if  they are true, and true if  there are intrinsically normative 
entities or facts that they correctly describe. Realists try to establish 
the normativity of  ethics by  arguing that values or obligations or 
reasons  really  exist  or, more  commonly,  by  arguing  against  the 
various forms of  skepticism about them.  This kind of  argument 
has been found in the work of  rational intuitionists ever since the 
eighteenth  century.  It was  advanced  vigorously  by  Clarke  and 
Price in the eighteenth century and by Prichard, G. E. Moore, and 
W. D. Ross in the early twentieth  century.9  It is also found in the 
9 Clarke, A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Reli- 
gion, and  the Truth and  Certainty  of  the Christian Revelation:  The Boyle Lectures 
1705; Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals; Prichard, Moral Obliga- 
tion and Duty and Interest: Essays and Lectures by H. A. Prichard; Moore, Principia 
Ethica; and Ross, The Right and the Good. [KORSGAARD]    The Sources of Normativity 25 
work  of  some  contemporary  moral  realists,  including  Thomas 
Nagel.10 
(3) I call the third view “Reflective Endorsement.”  This view 
is favored by  philosophers who believe that morality is grounded 
in human nature.  The philosopher’s first job is to explain what 
the source of  morality in human nature is, why we use moral con- 
cepts and feel ourselves bound by  them.  When an explanation of 
our moral nature is in hand, we can then raise the normative ques- 
tion: all things considered, do we have reason to accept the claims 
of our moral nature or should we reject them? The question is not 
“are these claims true?” as it is for the realist. The reasons sought 
here are practical reasons; the idea is to show that morality is good 
for us.  Arguments with this structure can be found in the tradition 
in the work of  Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and John Stuart 
Mill,  and  in  contemporary  philosophy  in  the work  of  Bernard 
Williams.“ 
(4)  The Appeal to Autonomy. This kind of argument is found 
in Immanuel Kant and contemporary Kantian constructivists, espe- 
cially John  Raw1s.12  Kantians believe that the source of the norma- 
tivity of moral claims must be  found in the agent’s own will, in 
particular in the fact that the laws of morality are the laws of the 
agent’s own will and that its claims are ones she is prepared to 
make on herself.  The capacity for self-conscious reflection about 
10  In The Possibility of Altruism and The View from Nowhere. But see note 44 
below. 
11 See Hutcheson, Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue and Illustrations on the Moral Sense; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 
and Enquiry concerning the Principles  of  Morals; Mill, Utilitarianism; and Williams, 
Ethics and  the Limits of Philosophy.  More specific references for Hutcheson, Hume, 
and Williams will be found in Lecture 2. Mill’s argument appears in chapter 3, 
“Of the Ultimate Sanction of  the Principle of  Utility.” 
12 See Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical 
Reason; Rawls, A Theory of  Justice and  “Kantian Constructivism  in Moral Theory: 
The Dewey Lectures  1980.” 26  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
our own actions confers on us a kind of  authority over ourselves, 
and it is this authority that gives normativity to moral claims. 
During the modern period, each of  these accounts of  norma- 
tivity developed in response to the prior one, sometimes as a result 
of  criticism, more often when the implications of  the earlier view 
were pressed a little harder.  In this lecture and the next one I am 
going to describe this historical process, comparing earlier versions 
of  these  accounts  with  those  on  the  contemporary  scene.  The 
Kantian  account was  the culmination  of  this historical  develop- 
ment.  In the third lecture I will present an updated version of that 
account that I believe to be true. 
In the rest of  this lecture I will discuss the first two theories 
of  normativity: voluntarism and moral realism. 
V oluntarism 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, Grotius asserted 
that human beings would have obligations even if God did not 
exist to give us laws.  Because of  that remark, he is often identified 
as the first  modern  moral  philosopher.13  But the credit for that 
should really go to Hobbes and Pufendorf.  For they were the first 
to identify clearly the special challenge that the Modern Scientific 
World View presents to ethics and to try to construct ethical theo- 
ries in the face of that challenge. 
According  to  Pufendorf,  the  actions  of  human  beings,  like 
every other  form  of  physical  motion, are in  themselves  morally 
indifferent.  Values  are not found in the world of  nature  at all. 
Instead,  Pufendorf  says,  intelligent  beings  must  impose  moral 
values on nature.  He tells us that what he calls “moral entities” - 
values and obligations  -  are “superadded” to physical entities - 
such as actions  -  at “the will of intelligent entities.”  l4 Hobbes 
opens his most famous ethical treatise with the apparently un- 
promising reflection that since to be  alive is simply to be a self- 
13 I owe this point to Schneewind. See Schneewind I, pp. 88–89. 
14 Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and of Nations, Schneewind I, p. 171. [KORSGAARD]  The Sources of Normativity 27 
moving object, we may as well say that watches and engines and 
other self-moving objects have an artificial  life, and that we our- 
selves in turn are just a kind of  machine.15  And he proceeds to 
construct  a  completely  mechanistic  explanation  of  how  human 
beings work and an ethics that is based upon it. 
Their question is  how  nature,  an indifferent  and mechanical 
world  of  matter  in motion, can  come to be  imbued with  moral 
properties.  Interestingly, both Pufendorf and Hobbes traced obli- 
gation ultimately to divine command, not because they hung on to 
a medieval or religious conception of the world, but rather because 
they  had adopted  the Modern Scientific World View.  They be- 
lieved that it takes God or a Godlike sovereign to impose moral 
properties on the indifferent world of nature.  Pufendorf held that 
“since . . . moral necessity . . . and turpitude . . . are affections of 
human actions arising from their conformity or non-conformity to 
some norm or law, and law is the bidding of a superior, it does not 
appear that [they] . . . can be conceived to exist before law, and 
without the imposition of a  superior.”16  And Hobbes of course 
maintained  that there is  no obligation  until  a sovereign  capable 
of  enforcing the “laws of  nature” is in power.  Obligation must 
come from law, and law from the will of  a legislating sovereign; 
morality only comes into the world when laws are made. 
Pufendorf  and Hobbes shared two other views of which their 
critics sometimes failed to see the importance.  First, voluntarism is 
often criticized on the ground that the sovereign can make anything 
right or wrong.  And many theological voluntarists have held that 
that is true.  But Pufendorf and Hobbes thought that the content 
of morality is given by reason independently of the legislative will. 
They agreed that good and evil, prudence and imprudence, and in 
a way  even justice and injustice, are objectively identifiable attri- 
butes  of  states of  affairs  and of  the actions that produce  them. 
What is good is what is naturally beneficial to a person; what is 
15Hobbes, Leviathan, introduction, p. 9. 
16 Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and of Nations, Schneewind I, p. 175. 28 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
right and just is what makes harmonious  social life possible.  So 
no legislator is needed to give content, at least in a general way, to 
the ideas of  the good and the right.  Most human beings in most 
circumstances have reason to want what is good and, at least as a 
group,  to  do what is right,  independently of  law or obligation. 
But  in  the  absence  of  God,  Pufendorf  wrote,  the precepts  of 
morality might “be observed for their utility, like the prescriptions 
doctors give to regulate health” but “. . . would not be laws.”17 
And  Hobbes,  after  laying  out his  laws  of  nature,  says:  “These 
dictates of  Reason,  men  use  to call by  the name of  Lawes; but 
improperly: for they  are but Conclusions,  or Theorems concern- 
ing what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; 
whereas Law, properly is the word of him that by right hath com- 
mand over others.” 18 So the role of the legislator is to make what 
is in any case a good idea into law. 
Second, both Pufendorf and Hobbes believed that no one could 
be a legislator without the power to impose sanctions to enforce 
his law.  And it is frequently inferred that the point of these sanc- 
tions is to provide the subjects of  the law with motives to obey it. 
Actually, however, both of these philosophers thought that morally 
good action is action that proceeds from what we would now call 
the motive of  duty.”  Morally good actions are done from what 
Pufendorf calls an “intrinsic motive” rather than from interest or 
fear.”  Pufendorf says that this marks the difference between obli- 
gation and compulsion; and Hobbes, similarly, that it marks the 
difference between  mere counsel and command.”  A just man, as 
17 Pufendorf, On the Duty  of Man and Citizen, p. 36. 
18 Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.15, p. 111. 
19  While  Pufendorf  is  almost  ignored  by  contemporary  moral  philosophers, 
there  is  a great deal of  controversy  about Hobbes’s views  on moral motivation and 
obligation  and  substantial recent  literature on  the  topic.  For  references,  see Tuck’s 
Introduction  to Leviathan, p. xliii.  While a complete defense of  the view I set for- 
ward  here would  require  taking  on the issues raised  by  that controversy, this is not 
the place for that. 
20 Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature  and of Nations, Schneewind I, p. 180. 
21 Ibid.; Hobbes, Leviathan, II.25, pp. 176-79. [KORSGAARD]  The Sources of Normativity 29 
Hobbes put it, is one whose will is “framed” by justice, not by fear 
or benefit to himself.22 One does the right thing because it is the 
right thing, because it is the law, and for no other reason. 
Why, then, are sanctions needed? The answer is that they are 
necessary  to  establish  the authority  of  the legislator.  Pufendorf 
and Hobbes thought that the legislator’s power to enforce the law 
is necessary to give moral commands the special force of  require- 
ment.  A homely example will illustrate their point.  Suppose you 
are a student in my  department.  Then my  colleagues and I  are 
in a position to require you to take a course in logic.  We  are in 
this  position  because  we  have  authority  over  you,  and we  have 
authority over you  in part because we can impose a sanction on 
you.  If  you  refuse  to take  the logic course, you  will  not get a 
degree from us.  Now I want you to notice several things about 
this.  First of all, the scenario does not in the least imply that our 
decision  to make you  study  logic is  arbitrary.  It may be  a very 
good idea for philosophy students to study logic, and that may be 
why we require it.  If  we are good at our jobs and worthy of  our 
authority, we will  have some such reason.  In a similar way the 
laws that God or the Hobbesian sovereign requires us to obey are 
precepts of  reason, determined independently of  any arbitrary leg- 
islative will. Yet it is not merely their reasonableness that obligates 
us  to obey them, just  as  it is not merely  the benefit of  studying 
logic  that obligates students in my  department to take the logic 
course.  For if  you are a philosophy student but are not in my de- 
partment, I can give you  all sorts of  excellent reasons why you 
should take a course in logic, and you will not thereby be required 
to take one.  And that is why authority requires a sanction. 
Let me play out the analogy a moment longer.  Suppose again 
that you are a student in my department and consider your motive 
for taking  the logic  course.  There are three  possibilities.  First, 
you might take it because you grasp the reasons why we require it. 
You  see that it is  a good idea and you  are moved by  that fact. 
22 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.15, p. 104. 30  The Tanner Lectures  on Humun Values 
Second, even if  you think the requirement  arbitrary and unneces- 
sary, you  may  take  the course out of  fear of  being  denied your 
degree-because of  the sanction. Or, third, you may take it simply 
because it is  a required  course.  The important point is that the 
third motive is appropriate here.  While you may very well grasp 
the reasons why we require the course, and it may even be true that 
for those reasons you would have taken it anyway, there is some- 
thing a little odd about saying that this is your motive.  Since it is 
required  you would have to take it in any case.  But there is no 
reason  to suppose that therefore you  only take it out of  fear of 
being  denied your  degree, as it were cringingly.  It’s being a re- 
quired course is, under the circumstances, itself  a reason.  This is 
the picture of  obligation, and of  what it is to act from the moral 
motive, that Hobbes and Pufendorf have in mind.  And according 
to  this picture  neither moral obligation  nor  its proper and char- 
acteristic motive, the motive of  duty, are possible  unless there is 
a legislator backed by  the power of  sanctions who can lay down 
the law. 
Let me sum up.  Hobbes and Pufendorf believed that the con- 
tent of  morality  is  given  by  natural reason.  What morality  de- 
mands of  us  is what it is reasonable for us, at least as a group, 
to do.  The rules of  morality  are the rules that make social life 
possible,  and social  life is necessary for human beings.  Hobbes 
and Pufendorf clearly supposed that in many cases this considera- 
tion  could be  motivationally  sufficient as well.  Pufendorf, espe- 
cially, says that in the absence of obligation we would still do what 
is right because it is useful.  The legislator is not invoked to supply 
the content of  morality or to explain why people are often moti- 
vated to do what is right. The legislator is necessary to make obli- 
gation possible, that is, to make morality normative. 
Realism 
Samuel Clarke, the first defender of realism, was quick to spot 
what he took to be a fatal flaw in the view I have just described. [KORSGAARD]  The Sources  of Normativity  31 
Hobbes, Clarke complains, tries to derive obligation from the so- 
cial contract, from our agreement to obey the laws of  a sovereign 
who will make social cooperation possible.  But why are we obli- 
gated to conform to the social contract?  Clarke says: “To make 
these compacts obligatory [Hobbes] is forced . . . to recur to an 
antecedent law of nature: and this destroys all that he had before 
said.  For  the same law of  nature which  obliges men to fidelity, 
after having made a compact; will unavoidably, upon all the same 
accounts, be found to oblige them, before all compacts, to content- 
ment and mutual benevolence . . .23 If the need to establish a 
cooperative system can obligate us to conform to a social contract, 
why  doesn’t  that  same need  obligate us  to  behave  ourselves  in 
cooperative ways in the first place? Or, if  we say obligation comes 
from the fact that the laws have been made by  the sovereign, then 
what are we to say about why we are obligated to obey the sov- 
ereign? Again Clarke complains that “compacts ought to be faith- 
fully performed, and obedience to be  duly paid to civil powers: 
the obligation these things [Hobbes] is forced to deduce entirely 
from the internal reason and fitness of the things themselves. . .” 
24 
Pufendorf  tries  to  explain why we are obligated to obey the 
sovereign, by defining a notion of legitimate authority. He stipu- 
lates that the superior who is able to obligate us must have these 
two attributes: “not only the strength to inflict some injury upon 
the recalcitrant but also just cause to require us to curtail the lib- 
erty of our will at his discretion.”25 He goes on to explain that 
another has the right to claim our obedience if  he has conferred 
exceptional benefits on us; or if he is able to look out for us much 
better than we can look out for ourselves; or of course if we have 
contracted to obey him.  So the authority of  the legislator springs 
not only from his power  to impose sanctions, but  also from our 
23 Clarke,  A  Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural 
24 Ibid., p. 221. 
25 Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, p. 28. 
Religion, Raphael I, p. 219. 32  The Tanner Lectures  on Human Values 
gratitude for his benefits or from his benevolent wisdom or from 
our own contractual  acts.  But the difficulty with this solution is 
obvious.  If  we  have  no antecedent  obligation to be grateful to 
benefactors, or to submit to the guidance of  benevolent wisdom, 
or to honor our agreements, how can these things confer legitimate 
authority on the legislator? And if  we do have a natural obliga- 
tion to these things, then why may we not have other natural obli- 
gations as well? The very notion of  a legitimate authority is al- 
ready a normative one and cannot be used to answer the norma- 
tive question. 
Hobbes has a way of  avoiding this last problem, but it is at a 
serious cost.  He says flatly that God’s authority does not depend 
on our gratitude or on His graciousness, but simply on His irre- 
sistible  power.26 And he concludes that this is true of the authority 
of  the political sovereign as well.  But this gives rise to a problem. 
The sovereign’s  authority  now  consists entirely  in his  ability  to 
punish us.  Although  sanctions are not our motive for obedience, 
they are the source of the sovereign’s authority and so of our obli- 
gations.  I am obligated to do what is right only because the sov- 
ereign can punish me if  I do not. Well, suppose I commit a crime 
and I get away with it.  Then the sovereign was not able to punish 
me.  And if  my obligation  sprang from his ability to punish me, 
then I had no obligation.  So  a crime I get away with is no crime 
at all.  If  irresistible power is just power unsuccessfully  resisted, 
then  authority  is  nothing  more  than  the successful  exercise  of 
power, and things always turn out right.  For no one can ever do 
what he lacks the power to do.27 
The problem  here  is  a  general  one,  which  applies  to  any 
attempt  to  derive  normativity  from  a  natural  source  of  power. 
Suppose the authority of  obligation derives from the power of our 
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, 11.31, p. 246. 
27 Strictly speaking, crime is still possible. If the sovereign catches me and 
punishes me, then  I did something wrong.  But wrongdoing  is always punished, for 
if  it  is  not,  then  it was  not  wrongdoing  after all.  So although not everything that 
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sympathetic motives.  Then if  you  lack sympathetic motives, you 
lack obligations. Your obligations vary along with your motives, 
and so you can do no wrong.  Suppose, as Hume sometimes seemed 
to think, that the authority of  our reasons for action must be de- 
rived  from the strength of  our desires.  Then you will always do 
what you have reason to do, and you can do no wrong.  As Joseph 
Butler  would  later  point  out, this  sort of  argument  shows  that 
authority cannot be reduced to any kind of  power.  And the rela- 
tion in which  moral claims stand to us is a relation of  authority, 
not one of power.28 
So we are faced with a dilemma.  If  we try to derive the au- 
thority  of  morality  from some  natural  source  of  power,  it  will 
evaporate in  our  hands.  If  we  try  to  derive it from  some  sup- 
posedly normative consideration, such as gratitude or contract, we 
must in turn explain why that consideration is normative, or where 
its authority comes from. Either its authority comes from morality, 
in which  case we have argued in a circle, or it comes from some- 
thing else,  in  which  case the question  arises  again, and we are 
faced with an infinite regress. 
The realist’s response is to dig in his heels. The notion of 
normativity or authority is  an irreducible one.  It is a mistake to 
try to explain it.  Obligation is simply there, part of the nature of 
things.  We  must suppose certain actions to be obligatory in them- 
selves if  anything is.  According to Clarke, it is a fact about cer- 
tain actions that they are fit to be done. Richard Price argues that 
unless we may  say  that some  actions  are in themselves  right or 
wrong it is impossible that we should have any obligations; and in 
turn that if some actions are intrinsically right or wrong it is sense- 
less to ask why we are obligated to do or avoid them.29 Because 
of these views, Clarke and Price were primarily polemical writers. 
28 See  Butler,  "Upon  Human  Nature,"  Sermon  2  of  the  Fifteen  Sermons 
Preached  at the Rolls Chapel and of  the Five Sermons, pp. 39-40. 
29 These positions  are defended  throughout in Clarke, A  Discourse concerning 
the  Unchangeable  Obligations  of  Natural  Religion;  and  Price,  A  Review  of  the 
Principal Questions in  Morals. 34  The  Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
They could not prove that obligation was real and instead devoted 
their  efforts  to rebutting what they  took to be  skeptical attacks. 
Early  twentieth-century  rational  intuitionism,  represented  by 
the work  of  Prichard, Ross,  and Moore, follows  a  similar  pat- 
tern.  It is clearest in Prichard’s classic essays: “Does Moral Phi- 
losophy Rest on a Mistake?” and “Duty and Interest.”  Prichard 
argues that it makes no sense to ask why you should be moral.  If  I 
give you  a moral reason -  such as, “it is your duty” -  then my 
answer is circular, since it assumes you should be moral.  If  I give 
you a self-interested reason -  such as, “it will make you happy”- 
then  my  answer  is  irrelevant.  That is  not the reason  why  you 
should be moral; you should be moral because it is your duty.  If  a 
question admits only of  answers that are either circular or irrele- 
vant then it must be a mistake to ask it. And if  that is the question 
of moral philosophy, Prichard thinks, then moral philosophy rests 
on a mistake.  Obligations just exist, and nobody needs to prove it. 
As these arguments show, realism is a metaphysical position in 
the exact sense criticized by Kant. We  can keep asking why: “Why 
must I do what is right?”-“Because it is commanded by God”- 
“But why must I do what is commanded by  God?” -  and so on, 
in  a way  that apparently can go  on forever.  This is what Kant 
called a search for the unconditioned -  in this case, for something 
that will bring the question “Why must I?” to an end.  The un- 
conditional answer must be one that makes it impossible, unneces- 
sary, or incoherent to ask why again.  The realist move is to bring 
this  regress  to an end by  fiat:  he declares  that some things are 
intrinsically normative.  Prichard joins Clarke and Price in assert- 
ing this  about  obligatory  actions,  while  Moore  thinks  there  are 
intrinsically good states of  affairs.30  The very nature of these in- 
trinsically normative entities is supposed to forbid further ques- 
tioning. Having discovered that he needs an unconditional answer, 
the realist straightaway concludes that he has found one. 
30 See Moore, Principia  Ethica,  and  also “The Conception  of  Intrinsic Value.” [KORSGAARD]  The Sources of Normativity  35 
A comparison will help to show why this is metaphysical. Con- 
sider the cosmological argument for the existence of  God, which 
purports to prove God’s existence by  proving that there must be 
a  necessarily existent being.  It runs  this way:  Somewhere  there 
must be an Entity whose existence is necessary in itself.  For if  an 
Entity is contingent, it can either exist or not exist.  How then can 
we  explain  its  existence?  Well, some  other  Entity  must  have 
brought it into being, have made it exist.  What then about this 
other Entity? Is it necessary or contingent? And if  it is contingent 
then what in turn made it exist? In this way we generate a regress, 
which  can only be brought to an end if  some Entity exists neces- 
sarily, that is, if  there is some Entity about which it is impossible, 
unnecessary, or incoherent to ask why It exists.  So there must be 
such an Entity, and that is God. 
As Hume pointed out in his Dialogues concerning Natural 
Religion, there are two problems  here.31  First of all, so far as the 
argument goes,  anything  could be  the necessary being.  It could 
be matter, or the universe, or the sun.  In placing the necessity in 
God, the cosmologist has simply placed it where he wanted to find 
it.  And  second,  unless  you  assume  that even  contingent beings 
must in some sense be necessary-  that is, that there must be an 
explanation that shows that they must have existed -  the argu- 
ment cannot even get started.32 
Moral realism is like that.  Having discovered that obligation 
cannot exist unless there are actions that it is necessary to do, the 
realist concludes that there must be such actions and that they are 
the very  ones  that we  have  always  thought were  necessary,  the 
31 Hume, The Dialogues  concerning Natural Religion, part IX. 
32 It may  not be obvious that Hume makes this second argument, but it is im- 
plied  by  one he does make.  Hume has  Cleanthes say,  “In such a chain too, or suc- 
cession  of  objects,  each  part is  caused  by  that which  preceded  it,  and  causes  that 
which succeeds it.  Where then is the difficulty?”  (p. 190). That of  course amounts 
to a denial that the items in the “chain” need be in any sense necessary.  It is worth 
noting that the cosmologist  Cleanthes explicitly quotes in the course of  his criticism 
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traditional moral duties.  And the same two problems exist.  The 
realist like the cosmologist places the necessity where he wanted to 
find  it.  And  the argument  cannot  even  get started, unless  you 
assume that there are some actions that are necessary to do. 
But when the normative question is raised, these are the exact 
points  that are in contention -whether there is really  anything 
I must do, and if  so whether it is this. So it is a little hard to see 
how realism can help. 
Yet realism  is seen by  many as the only hope for ethics, the 
only  option  to  skepticism,  relativism,  subjectivism,  and  all  the 
various ways of  thinking that the subject is hopeless.  There are, 
I think, two reasons for this.  One is clear from the arguments that 
I have just reviewed.  It can look as if  granting the existence of 
intrinsically normative entities is the only way to bring the endless 
question  “why” to an end and still save obligation.  The other is 
based on a confusion.  Realism may be defined in a way that makes 
it look like the logical opposite of  skepticism -  say, for instance, 
as the existence of  moral truth.  But considered as a substantive 
position, realism  actually involves more than that. 
Let me explain.  There is a trivial sense in which everyone who 
thinks  that ethics  isn’t hopeless  is a realist.  I will call this pro- 
cedural moral realism, and I will contrast it to what I will call sub- 
stantive moral realism.  Procedural moral realism is the view that 
there are answers to moral questions; that is, that there are right 
and wrong ways to answer them.  Substantive moral realism is the 
view that there are answers to moral questions because there are 
moral facts or truths, which those moral questions ask about. 
To see the difference, it helps  to consider normative realism 
more generally.  The procedural normative realist thinks that when 
we ask practical questions like “What must I do?” or “What is 
best in this case?” or “How should I live?” there are correct and 
incorrect things  to say.  This is  not just  a view  about morality. 
Suppose the correct answer to the question “How should I live?” 
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as they like would be making a mistake.  The view that there is no 
normative truth about action is the view that it is impossible to fail 
to do what you have reason to do, or should do, or ought to do: 
it is  the view, more or less, that it doesn’t matter what you do. 
Procedural  realism  isn’t completely  trivial,  for it  does  have  an 
opposite, but that opposite is a kind of  nihilism.  The denial of 
procedural normative realism  says that there is no ought, should, 
must, or reason at  all. 
But procedural realism does not require the existence of intrin- 
sically normative entities, either for morality or for any other kind 
of  normative claim.  It is consistent with the view that moral con- 
clusions are the dictates of  practical reason, or the projections of 
human sentiments, or the results  of  some constructive procedure 
like the argument from John Rawls’s original position.33 As long 
as  there  is  some  correct  or best  procedure  for answering moral 
questions, there is some way of  applying the concepts of  the right 
and the good.  And as long as there is some way of  applying the 
concepts of  the right and the good, we will have moral and more 
generally normative  truth.  Statements employing moral concepts 
will be true when those concepts are applied correctly. 
Perhaps an example will help here.  Most people suppose that 
the means/end  relation is normative, in the sense that the fact that 
a certain action is a means to your end provides you with a reason 
to do it.  Very few people have ever supposed that this requires an 
adjustment  in  the metaphysics  of  the Modern  Scientific World 
View,  say, by  the introduction of  intrinsically normative  entities 
into our ontology.  But how then do we establish that this relation 
is normative? One plausible answer comes from Kant.  Kant tells 
us that the means/end  relation is normative because of a principle 
of  practical  reason that he calls the hypothetical imperative.  The 
hypothetical imperative tells us that if we will an end, we have a 
33 See A Theory  of  Justice, part I.  Rawls characterizes his conception of justice 
as a “Kantian constructivist” one in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The 
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reason to will the means to that end.  This imperative, in turn, is 
not based  on  the  recognition  of  a normative  fact  or  truth, but 
simply on the nature of  the will.  To will an end, rather than just 
wishing for it or wanting it, is to set yourself to be its cause.  And 
to set yourself to be its cause is to set yourself to take the available 
means to get  it.34  So the argument goes from the nature of the 
rational will to a principle that describes a procedure according to 
which  such a will must operate, and from there to an application 
of  that principle that yields a conclusion about what one has a rea- 
son to do. And Kant of course thought that in a similar way moral 
principles could be  shown to be principles of  practical reasoning 
that are based on the nature of the will and yield conclusions about 
what we  ought to do.  There are then  facts, moral truths, about 
what we ought to do, but that is not because the actions are in- 
trinsically  normative.  They inherit their  normativity  from prin- 
ciples that spring from the nature of  the will -  the principles of 
practical reasoning. 
What distinguishes substantive from procedural  realism  is  a 
view  about  the relationship  between  the answers  to moral ques- 
tions and our procedures for arriving at those answers.  The pro- 
cedural moral realist thinks that there are answers to moral ques- 
tions  because  there  are  correct  procedures  for arriving at them. 
But the substantive moral realist thinks that there are correct pro- 
cedures  for  answering  moral  questions  because  there  are  moral 
truths or facts that exist independently of those procedures, which 
those procedures  track.35  Substantive realism conceives the pro- 
cedures for answering normative questions as ways of  finding out 
about  a certain  part of  the world, the normative  part.  To that 
extent, substantive moral realism  is distinguished not by  its view 
about what kind of  truths there are, but by  its view of  what kind 
34 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 414–17; in Beck's translation, 
35 Substantive realism  is a  version  of  procedural  realism,  of  course; what dis- 
tinguishes  it is its account  of  why there is  a correct procedure  for answering moral 
questions. 
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of  subject ethics is.  It conceives ethics as a branch of  knowledge: 
knowledge of  the normative part of  the world. 
Substantive moral realism has been criticized in many ways.  It 
has been argued that we have no reason to believe in intrinsically 
normative  entities or  objective values.  They are not harmonious 
with the Modern Scientific World View, nor  are they needed for 
giving scientific explanations. Since the time of Hume and Hutche- 
son, it has been  argued that there is no reason why such entities 
should  motivate  us,  disconnected  as  they  are  from our  natural 
sources of motivation.  Many of these criticisms have been summed 
up in John Mackie’s famous “Argument from Queerness.”  Here 
it is in Mackie’s own words: 
If  there were objective values, then  they would be entities or 
qualities  or relations  of  a  very  strange sort, utterly  different 
from  anything else  in  the  universe.  Correspondingly,  if  we 
were aware of  them, it would have to be by  some special fac- 
ulty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways of  knowing everything else. . . . 
Plato’s  Forms  give  a  dramatic picture  of  what objective 
values would have to be.  The Form of  the Good is such that 
knowledge of  it provides the knower with both a direction and 
an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells  the 
person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. 
An  objective good  would  be  sought by  anyone who was  ac- 
quainted with it, not because of  any contingent fact that this 
person,  or every person,  is  so constituted  that he desires this 
end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow 
built  into it.  Similarly,  if  there were  objective principles  of 
right and wrong, any wrong (possible)  course of  action would 
have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it.36 
And nothing, Mackie suggests, could be like that. 
Of course Mackie doesn’t  really prove that such entities couldn’t 
exist.  But he does have a point, although I think it is not the point 
36 J. L.  Mackie,  Ethics:  lnventing Right  and  Wrong, pp. 38 and 40, 40  The Tanner Lectures  on Human Values 
he  meant  to make.  If  someone falls into  doubt  about whether 
obligations really exist, it doesn’t help to say, “Ah, but indeed they 
do. They are real things.” To see this, imagine a case where 
morality requires you to face death rather than do a certain action. 
You ask the normative question: you want to know whether this 
terrible claim on you is justified.  Is it really true that this is what 
you must do?  The realist’s answer to this question is simply “Yes.” 
That is, all he can say is that it is true that this is what you ought 
to do.  This is of course especially troublesome when the rightness 
of  the action  is  supposed to be  self-evident and known  through 
intuition, so that there is nothing more to say about it. If the realist 
is not an intuitionist he can go back and get you to review the rea- 
sons why the action is required.  Prichard says explicitly that it is 
only because people sometimes need to do this before they can see 
the necessity of  an action  that  the question  “Why should I be 
moral?” appears to make sense when actually it does  not.37  So we 
need to remind ourselves that the action promotes pleasure, or is 
called for by  a universalizability criterion, or fosters social life. But 
this answer appears to be off  the mark.  It addresses someone who 
has fallen into doubt about whether the action is really required by 
morality, not someone who has  fallen into doubt about whether 
moral requirements are really normative. 
Now, to be fair to Prichard, it is clear from his essays that he 
takes words like “right” and “obligatory” to imply normativity by 
definition.  These terms, as he sees it, are normatively loaded, so 
that it is incorrect to  say  that an action is right or obligatory unless 
we are already sure that we really have to do it. In one sense, 
that’s fine: it is six of one, half  a dozen of the other, whether we 
ask, “Is this action really obligatory?” or “Is this obligation really 
normative?”  If  we take obligation to imply normativity, then the 
first question is the same as the second. The trouble with Prichard’s 
way of  talking about these matters is more a heuristic one.  The 
question  “Is this action really  obligatory ?”  can be understood as 
37 See Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” p. 8. [KORSGAARD]  The Sources of Normativity 41 
a question about whether moral concepts have been  applied cor- 
rectly  in  this  case -  whether,  for instance, the requirement can 
really be derived from the categorical imperative or the principle 
of  utility or some other moral principle.  And that is a different 
question from the question how this obligation or any obligation 
can be normative.  Prichard’s way of approaching the matter there- 
fore leads us to confuse the question of correct application with the 
question of  normativity.  And this actually happened to Prichard 
himself.  For  it led  him to think  that once we have  settled the 
question of  correct application, there can be nothing more to say 
about the normative question.38 
And that is the problem with realism: it refuses to answer the 
normative question.  It is a way of  saying that it cannot be done. 
Or rather, more commonly, it is a way of saying that it need not be 
done. For of course if  I do feel confident that certain actions really 
are required of  me, I might therefore be  prepared to believe that 
those  actions  are intrinsically obligatory  or objectively valuable, 
that just is a property they have.  Just listen to what Samuel Clarke 
says: “These things are so notoriously plain and self-evident, that 
nothing but the extremest stupidity of  mind, corruption of  man- 
ners, or perverseness of  spirit, can possibly make any man entertain 
the least doubt concerning them.”  39  Well, obviously he isn’t wor- 
ried. But suppose you are? Perhaps his confidence will make you 
take heart, but it is hard to see how else this could help. 
The difficulty here is plain.  The metaphysical  view  that in- 
trinsically normative entities or properties exist must be supported 
by our confidence that we really do have obligations.  It is because 
we  are confident  that obligation is real that we are prepared to 
believe in the existence of  some sort of  objective values.  But for 
that very reason  the appeal to objective values cannot be used to 
38 See  Lecture  2,  note  30,  for discussion  of  a  parallel  problem  in  Prichard’s 
attitude toward  skepticism  about  belief.  The point  is  perhaps  even  clearer  in that 
case. 
39 Clarke, A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Re- 
ligion, Raphael  I, p. 194; Schneewind I, p. 296. 42  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
support our confidence.  And the normative question arises when 
our confidence has been shaken, whether by  philosophy or by  the 
exigencies of life. So realism cannot answer the normative question. 
Some  contemporary  realists,  such  as  Thomas  Nagel,  have 
argued that realism need not commit us to the existence of curious 
metaphysical  objects  like  Plato's  Forms  or  Moore's  nonnatural 
intrinsic  values.  According  to  Nagel,  we  need  only  determine 
whether certain natural human interests, like our interest in having 
pleasure and avoiding pain, have the normative character that they 
appear to us  to have.  The point is not to look for some sort of 
specially normative object, but to look more objectively at the 
apparently normative considerations that present themselves in ex- 
perience.  That you are, say, in pain, seems like a reason to change 
your situation; the question is whether it is Utilitarianism 
itself can be seen as a naturalistic form of realism, and versions of 
it have been defended as such by contemporary realists like David 
Brink and Peter  Railton.41  Contemporary realists argue that there 
is no need to make the right and the good into mysterious entities. 
Nothing  seems  more  obviously  normative  than  pleasures  and 
pains,  or  desires  and aversions,  or our  natural interests.  So  the 
realist need not assume, as Mackie supposes, that believing in ob- 
jective values  is  believing in  some sort of  peculiar entities.  We 
need only believe that reasons themselves 
But if we take Mackie’s point in the way that I have suggested, 
this leaves the problem  in place.  For how do we determine that 
these reasons exist ? Like his rationalist predecessors, Nagel asserts 
that  all we can  do is  rebut  the skeptical arguments  against the 
reality of reasons and values.  Once we have done that, there is no 
special reason to doubt they  exist.43  And then when you see some- 
40 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 157. 
41 Brink,  Moral Realism and the Foundations  of Ethics, especially chapter  8; 
42 Nagel, The  View  from Nowhere, p. 144. 
43 Ibid., pp. 143-44. Nagel says: “It is very difficult to argue for such a possi- 
bility [the reality of values], except by refuting arguments against it” (p. 143). 
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thing that appears to be a reason, such as, say, your desire to avoid 
pain, the best explanation of  this appearance is that that’s what it 
is -  it’s a reason.44 
And there’s nothing wrong with that.  But it is an expression 
of confidence and nothing more. Just listen to what Thomas Nagel 
says: “In arguing for this claim, I am somewhat handicapped by 
the fact that I find it self-evident.” 45 Nagel’s manners are better 
than Samuel Clarke’s, but his predicament is the same. He isn’t 
worried. 
Now I’d like to pause for a moment and say something that I 
hope will  be  helpful about why  the normative  question slips so 
easily through our fingers.  Earlier I said that in a sense Prichard 
is asking the normative question.  For him “obligation” is a norma- 
tively loaded word.  If  “obligation” is a normatively loaded word, 
then  the normative question is whether certain actions are really 
obligatory.  If  “reason” is the normatively loaded word, as Nagel 
thinks, then the normative question is whether obligations give us 
reasons, or more generally whether we have any moral reasons.  If 
“objective”  is  a  normatively  loaded  word,  as  Mackie  seems  to 
44 Ibid.,  p.  141.  He actually  says:  “The method  is  to  begin  with  the reasons 
that appear  to obtain  from  my  own  point  of  view  and  those of  other  individuals; 
and ask what the best perspectiveless account of those reasons is.” Because Nagel 
believes  in  the  existence  of  reasons,  rather  than  Forms  or Non-Natural  properties, 
it would  be  easy  to  suppose that he is  only what  I have here called  a “procedural 
realist.”  Actually  the  issue  is  a  bit  complicated.  I  categorize  him  here  as  a  sub- 
stantive realist  because he seems  to  believe,  as  the passage  quoted  shows,  that our 
relation  to  reasons  is  one of  seeing  or knowing  that they are there.  As  I have just 
argued,  there is  a way  in which  this view  of  ethics  as  an epistemological  subject  is 
the essential characteristic of substantive realism. But in §II of my paper “The Rea- 
sons  We Can  Share:  An  Attack  on  the  Distinction  between  Agent-Relative  and 
Agent-Neutral Values” I argue that it is Possible to understand the projects Nagel 
prosecutes in both The Possibility of Altruism and The View from Nowhere as con- 
structivist projects  and  that Nagel  himself  wavers  between  that way  and  a  realist 
way of  construing his own work.  If  we read Nagel as a constructivist then he is only 
a procedural realist. 
45 Nage1, The View from  Nowhere,  pp. 159-60. Actually he says this about 
the idea that pain and pleasure provide “agent-neutral” rather than “agent-relative’’ 
reasons.  But he says  things pretty much  like this about whether reasons exist at all. 
For  instance  on  p.  157 he says that  if  there is no  special  reason  to doubt the exis- 
tence of  reasons  then  denying that pain  provides  a reason  to change your  situation 
“seems meaningless.” 44  The Tanner Lectures  on Human Values 
think, then the normative question is whether obligations are ob- 
jective, and so on. 
Discussions  of  normativity  often  founder  because  of  unex- 
amined assumptions  about  the normatively  loaded word.  There 
are two problems  here.  First, philosophers  making different as- 
sumptions about which is the normatively loaded word may fail to 
understand each other. The second and perhaps more serious prob- 
lem is that all of the ways of  formulating the normative question 
that I have just mentioned suffer from the fact that they are readily 
confused with different questions.  As I pointed out in my  discus- 
sion of Prichard, the question whether the action is “really obliga- 
tory” can be confused with the question whether the moral concept 
really applies.  In a similar way, the question whether an obligation 
really provides a reason can be confused with the question whether 
it provides an adequate motive.  Again, the question whether the 
obligation is objective can be confused with the question whether 
the moral concept is one whose application is determinate or suf- 
ficiently “world-guided.” In all of these cases, the philosopher is led 
to think that settling the other question, whatever it is, is a way of 
settling the normative question.  And in all of these cases it is not. 
Part of  what I have tried  to do in this lecture is to raise the 
normative question in a way that is independent of our more ordi- 
nary normative concepts and words.  No doubt this has sometimes 
been confusing as I have tried to describe and compare the views 
of philosophers who use different terms to imply normativity.  The 
point is not that I think that there is no normatively loaded word. 
Of  course we will have to use some words to imply normativity, 
but we can choose any of the above ways of talking or others. All 
that matters there is that we agree, so that we will understand each 
other.  But the interesting question is not how we decide to talk 
about the issue.  The interesting question is why there should be 
such an issue: that is, why human beings need normative concepts 
and words.  And  substantive  realism -  to get back  now  to  my 
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thinks) or “good” (as Moore thinks) or “reason” (as Nagel 
thinks)  are normative words that we know how to apply correctly. 
It is a view -  and a false one -  about why human beings have 
normative words. 
What is really wrong with substantive realism is its view about 
the source of  normativity.  Why do we use normative concepts like 
good, right, reason, obligation ? According to the substantive realist, 
it is because we grasp that there are things that have normative 
properties.  Some things appear normative, and there is no reason 
to doubt that they are what they seem.  We  have normative con- 
cepts  because  we’ve  spotted some  normative entities,  as it were 
wafting by. 
According to substantive realism, then, ethics is really a theo- 
retical or epistemological subject.  When we ask ethical questions, 
or  normative  questions  generally,  there  is  something about  the 
world that we are trying to find out.  The world contains a realm 
of  inherently normative entities, whose existence we have noticed, 
and the business  of  ethics, or of  practical philosophy more gen- 
erally, is to investigate them further, to learn about them in a more 
systematic way.  But isn’t ethics supposed to be a practical subject, 
a guide to action?  Well, the realist will grant that the eventual 
point is to apply all this knowledge in practice.  Look at the result 
of that view:  according to the substantive realist, the moral life 
is the most sublime feat of  technical  engineering, the application 
of theoretical knowledge to the solution of human problems.  And 
in  general  human  life  and  action  consist  in  the  application  of 
theories, theories about what is good.  Now that is surely wrong. 
I’ve just  been  criticizing moral  realism  for asserting that we 
have moral concepts because we have noticed some moral entities 
in  the universe.  There’s another argument on the contemporary 
scene that makes what looks like a similar criticism, but takes this 
criticism as a reason for moral skepticism.  Since I am not arguing 
for skepticism,  I  want to say  something about that.  This other 
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moral entities or facts, because we do not need to assume the exis- 
tence of  such entities or facts in order to explain the moral phe- 
nomena.  We  need to assume that physical entities and facts exist 
in order to explain our observations of  and beliefs about the “ex- 
ternal world,” but we do not need to assume that moral facts or 
entities exist  in  order  to  explain  our moral beliefs  and motives. 
Explanations of  those can proceed in entirely psychological terms. 
So, the argument suggests, the best explanation of why I see a rock 
is that there is one.  But the best explanation of why I disapprove 
of killing is that I was brought up in a certain way.46 
A  more  carefully  formulated  version  of  this  argument  has 
some force against substantive moral realism, and this is a point I 
will come back  to.  But I want to start by  saying what I think is 
wrong with this argument.  As it is stated, this argument looks as 
if  it should work against any form of normative realism.  It should 
have just as much force against the existence of theoretical norma- 
tive truth  (that x is a reason to believe y)  as it does against prac- 
tical normative truth (that x is a reason to do y). We can after all 
explain  the occurrence of  people’s beliefs merely in terms of  the 
causes of  those beliefs and leave their reasons out of  it.  Even if 
people’s beliefs are caused by  their  thoughts about what reasons 
they  have, we can  explain  the beliefs  simply as caused by  those 
thoughts.  This does not commit us to saying that the reasons that 
appear in the contents of  those thoughts are real.  I may tell the 
truth  because  I  think  lying wrong, but  in order to  explain my 
honesty you need not suppose that my reason is real.  It is enough 
that I think so.  In the same way, I think that I am mortal because 
I am  human, but in order to explain why I believe I am mortal 
you need not suppose that my  reason is real.  Again it is enough 
that I think so.  So we don’t need to assume that theoretical rea- 
sons exist in order to explain the occurrence of  beliefs.47  But we 
48 The locus classicus is perhaps Gilbert  Harman,  The  Nature  of  Morality: An 
Introduction to Ethics, chapter 1. 
47 Actually,  however,  there  is a  problem  explaining how human  beings  could 
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cannot coherently take that fact as a reason to doubt that there is 
any such thing as a reason for belief.  For if  there is no such thing 
as  a reason  for belief, there is ipso facto no reason  for believing 
this  argument.  And -  to  echo  Clarke himself -  if  instead we 
admit that there are reasons  for belief, then why not admit that 
there are reasons for action as well? 
The trouble with drawing skeptical conclusions from the fact 
that  a  belief  in  normative  truth  is  not  needed  to  explain what 
people think or do is that it assumes that explanation and descrip- 
tion of  the phenomena is the sole or primary function of  human 
concepts.  That amounts to supposing that the business of  human 
life is the construction and application of  theories.  And the rea- 
son the argument has some force against substantive realism is that 
substantive realism implicitly shares that assumption. The substan- 
tive  realist  assumes we have normative concepts because we are 
aware that the world contains normative phenomena, and we are 
inspired by  that awareness to construct theories about them. 
But  that is  not why  we  have  normative  concepts.  The very 
enterprise we are engaged in right now shows why we have those: 
it is because we have to figure out what to believe and what to do. 
Normative  concepts  exist  because human beings  have normative 
problems.  And we have normative problems because we are self- 
conscious rational  animals, capable  of  reflection  about what we 
ought to believe and to do.  That is why the normative question 
can be raised in the first place: because even when we are inclined 
to believe that something is right and to some extent feel ourselves 
moved to do it we can still always ask: “But is this really true?” 
and “Must I really do this ?” 
Normative concepts  like right,  good, obligation, and reason 
are our names for the solutions to normative problems, for what 
it is we are looking for when we face them.  And if we sometimes 
succeed in  solving those problems, then there will be normative 
sons  if  no  such  things  exist at all.  But the reason  why we have  the concept  of  a 
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truths:  that  is,  statements  that  employ  normative concepts  cor- 
rectly.  So it is true that the assumption of  a realm of  inherently 
normative entities or objective values is not needed to explain the 
existence  of  normative concepts  or the resulting existence  of  a 
category of  normative truths.  It is not because we notice norma- 
tive entities in the course of  our experience, but because we are 
normative  animals who can question our experience, that norma- 
tive concepts exist. 
Con  clusio  n 
Contemporary  defenses  of  substantive  moral  realism  almost 
always arise in the same way.  They are always initiated by some- 
body else, a self-proclaimed spokesperson for the Modern Scien- 
tific World View.  Armed with the distinction between  facts and 
values, or brandishing Ockham’s razor like a club, the spokesperson 
for the Modern Scientific World View declares that there cannot 
be  ethical knowledge, that we can explain the moral phenomena 
without positing the existence of  moral entities or  facts, or that 
intrinsically normative entities are just too queer to exist.  And the 
moral philosopher, frantic with the sense of impending loss, rushes 
to the defense of ethical knowledge.  And nobody pauses to ask 
whether ethical knowledge, or indeed any sort of knowledge at all, 
is what we really want here in the first place. 
Is the normative question a request for knowledge?  To raise 
the normative question  is  to  ask  whether  our more unreflective 
moral beliefs and motives can withstand the test of  reflection.  The 
Platonic realist thinks that we can answer that question by  taking 
a closer look at the objects of our beliefs and motives, to discover 
whether they are really the True and the Good.  Nagel thinks we 
should take a closer look at the beliefs and motives themselves, to 
discover whether they are really reasons.  But no such discovery is 
ever made.  The realist’s belief in the existence of normative enti- 
ties  is not based  on any discovery.  It is based on his confidence 
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can support a metaphysics that in turn is supposed to support the 
claims  of  morality,  why  can’t confidence  support  the claims  of 
morality more directly? 
In the next lecture I will examine the views of  some philoso- 
phers who  reject  the idea  that knowledge is what we need  for 
normativity and put something more like confidence in its place. 
According to these philosophers, morality is not grounded in our 
apprehension  of  truths about objective values.  It is grounded in 
human nature and certain natural human sentiments.  The norma- 
tive question is then whether it is good to have such a nature and 
to  yield  to  its  claims.  Normativity  will  be  established,  not  by 
knowledge, but by  our own reflective endorsement of  our moral 
na ture. 
LECTURE II: REFLECTIVE ENDORSEMENT 
Introduction 
At the end of  the last lecture I argued that normativity is a 
problem for human beings because of  our reflective nature.  Even 
if  we are inclined to believe that an action is right and even if we 
are inclined to be motivated by  that fact, it is always possible for 
us to call our beliefs and motives into question.  This is why, after 
all, we seek a philosophical foundation for ethics in the first place: 
because we are afraid that the true explanation of  why we have 
moral  beliefs  and motives  might not be one that sustains them. 
Morality might not survive reflection. 
The view I am going to describe in this lecture takes its start- 
ing point from that thought.  It applies one of  the best rules of 
philosophical methodology:  that a clear statement of the problem 
is also a statement of the solution.  If the problem is that morality 
might not survive reflection, then the solution is that it might.  If 
we find upon reflecting on the true moral theory that we still are 
inclined  to  endorse  the claims  that morality  makes  on us,  then 
morality will be normative.  I call this way of establishing norma- 
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The reflective  endorsement  method  has  its  natural home  in 
theories that reject realism and ground morality in human nature. 
In the modern period it makes its first appearance in the work of 
the sentimentalists of  the eighteenth  century.  They explicitly re- 
jected  the realism  of  the rationalists  and argued that the moral 
value of actions and objects is a projection of  human sentiments. 
As Hume famously says: 
Take any  action  allow'd  to be vicious:  Willful murder, for 
instance.  Examine it in all lights, and see if  you can find that 
matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice.  In which- 
ever way you  take it, you find only certain passions, motives, 
volitions and thoughts.  There is no other matter of fact in the 
case.  The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the 
object.  You can never find it, till you turn your reflexion into 
your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which 
arises in you, towards this action.  Here is a matter of fact; but 
’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not 
in the object.1 
Strictly speaking, we  do not disapprove  the action because  it is 
vicious; instead, it is vicious because we disapprove it.  Since mo- 
rality  is  grounded  in  human  sentiments, the normative question 
cannot be whether its dictates are true.  Instead, it is whether we 
have reason to be glad that we have such sentiments and to allow 
ourselves to be governed by  them.  The question is whether mo- 
rality is a good thing for us. 
Of  course the sentimentalists were not the first to ground mo- 
rality in human nature.  Some of  the classical Greek philosophers, 
in particular Aristotle, did so as well.  So it is not surprising that 
the reflective endorsement method has reemerged in some recent 
moral thought of Aristotelian inspiration, namely that of  Bernard 
Williams.2 Like Hume, Williams rejects realism  and defends in 
1 Hume, Treatise of  Human Nature, III.l.i, p. 469. 
2 These remarks will naturally raise the question whether Aristotle himself  used 
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its  place  a  theory  that grounds  morality  in  human  dispositions. 
And like Hume, he finds that the answer to the normative ques- 
tion rests in whether those dispositions are ones we have reason to 
endorse. 
My purpose in this lecture is to explain this method of  estab- 
lishing normativity in more detail and to defend it against certain 
natural  objections that arise from the realist camp.  My aim will 
not be to criticize this view.  Instead, I will end by  saying why I 
think the logical consequence of  Hume and Williams’s theory of 
normativity is the moral philosophy of Kant. 
David Hume 
The choice of  Hume as the major traditional representative of 
a  theory  of  normativity  might  seem perverse.  The pose  Hume 
strikes in his moral philosophy is that of  the scientist, whose task 
is to explain the origin of moral ideas.  In his essay “Of the Dif- 
ferent Species of Philosophy,” Hume firmly separates two different 
ways of  treating moral philosophy, which we may call  “theoreti- 
cal” and “practical.”  Theoretical or “abstruse”  philosophers  re- 
gard human nature as a subject of  speculation and are concerned 
to  discover the principles that regulate our understanding, excite 
our sentiments, and cause us to approve and disapprove as we 
Practical philosophers, by  contrast, are interested in inciting us to 
good conduct.  Their work, as Hume puts it, is to paint virtue in 
“amiable colors, borrowing  all helps from poetry and eloquence, 
and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such 
as is best  fitted to please  the imagination  and engage the affec- 
tions.”  Hume compares the theoretical philosopher to an anato- 
claim  that reflective endorsement is at least involved in Aristotle’s method of  justify- 
ing morality. (See below). But Aristotle’s teleological conception of the world adds 
another element to his conception of  normativity.  In these lectures I am addressing 
modern methods of  establishing normativity, so I have not discussed Aristotle’s views 
directly.  What I think about them will, however, become apparent in the course of 
Lecture III. 
3 Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, p.  6. 
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mist and the practical philosopher to a  painter.5  The business of 
the anatomist is to explain what causes us to approve of  virtue; 
the business of  the painter is to make virtue appealing. And Hume 
styles himself  a theoretical philosopher: his  aim is to reveal the 
elements of  the mind’s “anatomy” that make us approve and dis- 
approve as we do. 
The odd thing about this way of  dividing up the philosophical 
enterprise is  that the normative  question  seems to  fall between 
the cracks.  Neither  the anatomist nor  the painter  seems  to be 
interested in the justification of  morality’s claims.  The theoretical 
philosopher  is  concerned  only with providing a true explanation 
of  the origin  of  moral  concepts.  The practical philosopher  is  a 
preacher or a Mandevillian politician.  His task is to get people to 
behave  themselves  in socially useful ways, and he is prepared to 
use  “all helps from poetry and eloquence.”  So we have explana- 
tion on the one hand and persuasion on the other, but no branch 
of  moral philosophy that is concerned with justification. 
It is not that Hume takes it for granted that morality’s claims 
can  be  justified  to  the individual.  He explicitly  denies  that the 
truth of  his  theoretical  account  depends at all on  “its tendency 
to promote the interests of  society.”  He thinks it is conceivable 
that  knowledge  of  the  true moral  theory  would  undermine the 
commitment of  individuals to moral conduct.  Yet he also asserts 
that “a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however 
true, which . . . leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious.”  As 
he says:  “The ingenuity of  your researches may be  admired, but 
your  systems will  be  detested;  and mankind will  agree,  if  they 
cannot refute them, to sink them, at least, in eternal silence and 
oblivion. Truths which are pernicious to society, if any such there 
be, will yield to errors which are salutary and advantageous.”  But 
although he admits that this could happen, he thinks that it doesn’t. 
Although he is not supposed to be  a practical philosopher, Hume 
5 Ibid.,  pp, 9-10;  A  Treatise of Human Nature,  III.iii.6,  pp. 620-21. I owe a 
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cannot resist pointing out that his account of  the origin of  moral 
ideas  does  make  virtue  attractive.  According  to  his  theory,  he 
points  out, virtue  asks nothing of  us  but  “gentleness, humanity, 
beneficence, and affability.”  And he urges: “She talks not of  use- 
less austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. She declares 
that her  sole purpose is  to make her votaries  and all mankind, 
during every instant of  their  existence, if  possible,  cheerful and 
happy  . . .”  6 So Hume thinks that his account of morality, though 
itself  theoretical  and abstruse, can  be used  by  the practical phi- 
losopher to good effect. 
One can, of  course,  take Hume to be saying merely  that his 
theory is a gold mine for practical philosophers.  But I think he 
has something more in mind.  Normativity is not the provenance 
of either the theoretical or the practical philosopher because it will 
emerge, if  it does emerge, in the way the two sides of philosophy 
interact.  If  the true account of  our moral nature were one that 
made us want to reject its claims, then practical philosophers,  as 
the guardians of social order, would have to make sure that the truth 
was not known.  But if  practical philosophers can get people to ac- 
cept the claims of morality simply by telling them the truth about the 
nature of morality, then the claims of morality are justified.  Hume 
is claiming that his theory is normative -  or so I will now argue. 
According to Hume, moral judgments are based on sentiments 
of  approval and disapproval  that we feel when we contemplate 
a person’s character from what he calls “a general point of view.”7 
Taking  up  the general  point  of  view  regulates our  sentiments 
about a person in two ways.  First, we view the person not through 
the eyes of  our own interests, but instead through the eyes of  our 
sympathy with the person herself  and her friends, family, neigh- 
bors, and  colleagues.8  We are sympathetically pleased or pained 
6All of  the  quotations  in  this  paragraph  are from Hume, Enquiry  concerning 
7 Hume, A Treatise  of Human Nature,  III.3.i, pp. 581-82. 
8 Ibid., p. 582. 
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by  the good or bad  effects of  her character on those with whom 
she usually associates, the people Hume calls her “narrow circle.” 
Second, we judge her characteristics according to the usual effects 
of  such characteristics, rather than according to their actual effects 
in this or that case.  As Hume puts it, we judge according to “gen- 
eral rules.” l0
These two regulative devices bring a kind of objectivity to our 
moral  judgments.  Judging  in  sympathy  with  the narrow  circle 
and according to general rules, we are able to reach agreement, in 
the sense of  a convergence  of  sentiments, about a person’s char- 
acter.  We all approve and disapprove of  the same characteristics, 
and as a result we come to share an ideal of good character.  A per- 
son of good character, one whom we judge to have the virtues, is 
one who is useful and agreeable to herself  and her friends.  Since 
people love those who have useful  and agreeable  qualities,  and 
since the perception of  a lovable quality in ourselves causes pride, 
virtue is  a natural cause of  pride,  and vice in the same way of 
humility. And since pride is a pleasing sentiment and humility a 
painful one, we have a natural desire to be proud of  ourselves and 
to avoid the causes of  humility.  This gives us  a natural desire to 
acquire the virtues and avoid the vices.  The normative question, 
then, is whether we really have reason to yield to these desires and 
to try to be virtuous people. 
I think this is the question Hume is raising in the last section 
of  the Enquiry concerning the Principles of  Morals when he says: 
“Having  explained  the  moral  approbation  attending  merit  or 
virtue, there remains nothing but briefly to consider our interested 
obligation to it, and to inquire whether every man, who has any 
regard to his own happiness and welfare, will not find his account 
in the practice of every moral virtue.” 
9 Ibid.,  III.3.iii, p. 602. 
10 Ibid.,  III.3.i, p. 585. 
11 Hume, Enquiry concerning  the Principles of Morals, p. 278. [KORSGAARD]  The Sources of Normativity 55 
Hume proceeds  to  detail  the ways  in which  the practice of 
virtue  contributes  to  the moral  agent’s happiness.  His fourfold 
division of  the virtues into qualities useful and agreeable to self 
and others enables him to do this in very short order.  No argu- 
ment is needed to defend the qualities that make you useful and 
agreeable  to yourself,  for those  contribute  to your  happiness  by 
definition.  Almost as little is required to defend the qualities that 
make you agreeable to others, for we all want others to like and 
admire us.  To defend the qualities that are useful to others, Hume 
borrows a famous argument from Joseph  Butler.I2 In order to be 
happy, we must have some desires and interests whose fulfillment 
will bring us satisfaction.  And other-directed desires and interests 
are just as good for this purpose as self-absorbed ones.  Indeed, 
in many ways they are better.  Hume reminds us that any desire, 
“when gratified by  success, gives a satisfaction proportioned to its 
force and violence.”  But benevolent  desires have the additional 
advantages that their “immediate feeling . . . is sweet, smooth, 
tender, and agreeable” and that they make others like us and make 
us pleased with  ourselves.13 To be a morally good person, then, is 
conducive to your  happiness  or at least not inconsistent with it. 
Now it might be thought that this argument is not intended to 
show anything about the goodness of  being subject to motives of 
moral obligation and that therefore it cannot show anything about 
the normativity of obligation.  For according to Hume’s account a 
naturally virtuous person is one who acts, not from the motive of 
duty or obligation, but simply from some natural motive, such as 
benevolence, that a spectator would approve.  No reason why you 
are obligated  to perform  virtuous  actions has been  given by  the 
argument or is required by it; you perform virtuous actions because 
you have natural motives to do so; and the argument has simply 
shown that this is a good way for you to be. 
12 Butler, “Upon the Love of Our Neighbor,” sermon 11 of the Fifteen Sermons 
13  Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles  of  Morals, p. 282. 
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But this would not be correct.  For first, Hume admits that in a 
case where a person is aware of  lacking a virtuous moral motive, 
he  “may hate himself  upon  that account,  and may  perform  the 
action without the motive,  from a certain sense of  duty.” l4  And 
second, it turns out that in the case of  what Hume calls the arti- 
ficial virtues such as justice, this sense of  duty is the motive that is 
normally operative.“  According to Hume, the first or natural mo- 
tive for participating in a system of  justice is self-interest.  But this 
is not the usual motive for performing just actions, for just actions, 
taken  singly,  do  not  necessarily  or  even  usually  promote  self- 
interest.  What promotes self-interest is the existence of the system 
of  justice.  But the connection between individual just actions and 
the system is too “remote” to sustain interested  motivation.16  In- 
stead, Hume argues, sympathy with the public interest causes us 
to  disapprove  of  all unjust  actions  on  account  of  their general 
tendency to bring down the  system.17 And this sympathy grounds 
a sense of  duty that motivates us to avoid injustice.  We  avoid in- 
justice  because  we  would  disapprove  of  ourselves -  that is, we 
would feel humility -  if we did not. 
Furthermore, there are cases in which this sense of duty is the 
only available motive, for it can happen that an action, while it is 
of  the type that tends to bring down the system of justice, will not 
in fact do that system any harm at all, and that the agent knows 
that.  This is the plight of the famous “sensible knave” who poses 
the most difficult challenge to Hume’s account of  “interested obli- 
gation.”  The sensible knave, as Hume describes him, “may think 
that an act of  iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addi- 
tion to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the 
social union and confederacy.” 
l8  So why shouldn’t he do it? 
14 Hume, A Treatise  of  Human Nature, 111.24  p.  479. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.,  111.2.ii, p. 499. 
17 Ibid., pp. 499–500. 
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This is, of  course,  a version  of  the familiar free-rider  prob- 
lem.  The sensible knave wants to know why he should not profit 
from injustice when it will not damage his interests by  endanger- 
ing the system of  justice.  And here is Hume’s surprising answer: 
I must confess that, if  a man think that this reasoning much 
requires an answer, it will be a little difficult to find any which 
will  appear  to him satisfactory and convincing.  If  his heart 
rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if  he feel no reluc- 
tance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost 
a considerable motive to virtue;  and we may  expect  that his 
practice will be answerable to his speculation. . . . Inward peace 
of  mind,  consciousness of  integrity,  a  satisfactory review  of 
our  own  conduct;  these  are circumstances,  very  requisite  to 
happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by  every honest 
man, who feels the importance of them.19 
There’s an old joke about a child who’s glad he doesn’t like spin- 
ach, since then he’d eat it, and he hates the disgusting stuff.  Hume 
appears at first sight to be giving us that sort of  reason for being 
glad we don’t like injustice.  Of  course integrity will be cherished 
by  honest people who feel the importance of  it.  But the sensible 
knave  is  questioning  exactly  that importance.  The fact that we 
disapprove of injustice and therefore of ourselves when we engage 
in it can hardly be offered as a reason for endorsing our own dis- 
approval of  injustice. 
Actually, however, in Hume’s theory it can.  Hume’s theory of 
sympathy allows him to argue that an individual is likely to experi- 
ence humility when he acts unjustly  regardless of  whether or not 
he believes that there is good reason  to disapprove of  the unjust 
action in the case at hand.  For it follows from Hume’s account of 
sympathy that the sentiments of  others are contagious to us.  And 
their sentiments about ourselves, in particular, have a tendency to 
get under our skins.  So the fact that other people will disapprove 
19 Ibid., p. 283. 58  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
and dislike the sensible knave will be sufficient to provide him 
with feelings of  disapproval and dislike of  himself.  Of  course a 
knave will try to keep his knavish actions secret.  But unless he is 
very hardened indeed, even the knowledge that others  would hate 
him if  they knew what he is up to will be enough to produce hu- 
mility and self-hatred when he acts unjustly.  As Hume says: 
By  continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a repu- 
tation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct 
frequently in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes 
of those who approach and regard us.  This constant habit of 
surveying ourselves as it were, in reflection, keeps alive all the 
sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a 
certain reverence for themselves as well as others, which is the 
surest guardian of every virtue.20 
So Hume’s reply to the sensible knave is not circular.  Morality 
provides  a set of  pleasures of its own, a set of  pleasures that the 
knave loses out on.  Because of  sympathy, the sense that you are 
lovable and worthy  in the eyes of  others makes you lovable and 
worthy in your own.  For the same reason, the sense that you are 
detestable in the eyes of  others makes you detestable in your own. 
And morality provides  these  feelings  regardless of  whether you 
think that morality is justified or not.  This fact enables Hume to 
add the familiar claim that virtue is its own reward to his list of 
the ways in which virtue promotes self-interest without any circu- 
larity at all. Together, all of these arguments establish what Hume 
calls our “interested obligation” to be moral. 
The arguments I’ve just detailed give rise to two closely related 
criticisms,  which  issue  from the realist  camp.  First, you  might 
think that Hume is not giving an account of  the normativity of 
morality, but simply an account of  our motives to be moral, and 
one that falls afoul of Prichard’s famous argument at that.21 We 
20 Ibid.,  p. 276. 
21 For a discussion of  Prichard’s argument, see “Realism” in Lecture I. [KORSGAARD] The  Sources of Normativity  59 
should not practice virtue because it is in our interest, but rather 
for its own sake, so Hume’s argument is irrelevant.  But it is clear 
that Hume is not saying that we should perform particular virtuous 
or obligatory actions because it serves our own interest to do so. 
He is  saying that it is in our interest to be people who practice 
virtue for its own sake.  This is especially clear in the Butlerian 
argument  used  to  defend  the virtues  that  are useful  to  others. 
Neither the immediately agreeable sensations of  benevolence nor its 
gratifications  are available  to  anyone who is  not genuinely  and 
wholeheartedly  concerned  about others.  The Butlerian argument 
is not meant to show that morality promotes some set of  interests 
you already have, but rather that moral interests are good ones to 
have.  What the argument establishes is the harmony of two poten- 
tially normative points of  view, morality and self-interest.22 
The  second  realist  objection  carries  Prichard’s  worry  to  a 
higher level.  This time the objector grants that Hume’s argument 
is not offered to us as a wrongheaded theory of  moral motivation, 
but rather as an attempt to establish normativity by  showing that 
morality is good.  But it says that even as such it fails.  An argu- 
ment that shows that virtue is good from the point of view of self- 
interest only shows that morality is extrinsically good or extrinsi- 
cally normative.  But what we need for normativity is to show that 
morality is intrinsically good or intrinsically normative.  And now 
we  come  back  to  a  thought  familiar  from  our  encounter  with 
realism: that only something intrinsically normative can satisfy the 
demand for unconditional justification. 
At this point it will help to turn to an earlier view Hume held 
about normativity.  The arguments I have been detailing until now 
are for the most part from the Enquiry concerning the Principles 
of Morals. In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume appealed to a 
22 The argument  can  therefore  be  seen  as  establishing what  Rawls  calls  “con- 
gruence.” See A Theory  of  Justice, p. 399.  Rawls’s own argument that justice is a 
good for the just person, in §86 of that work, is a congruence argument. On the 
use  of  congruence  arguments  among  the  eighteenth-century  British  Moralists,  see 
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more specific version of  the reflective endorsement account, which 
I call  “normativity as reflexivity.”  This view can help to answer 
the realist’s worry. 
Since Hume does not set this view out explicitly, I will start by 
explaining the grounds on which I attribute it to him.  Book 1 of 
A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  ends  in  a  mood  of  melancholy 
despair and skepticism, while book  3 concludes in a mood of tri- 
umphant affirmation.  And  this  is  because at the end of  book  l 
Hume  finds  that  “the  understanding,  when  it  acts  alone,  and 
according to  its  most  general principles,  entirely  subverts  itself, 
and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, 
either in philosophy or common life.”  23  Whereas at the end of 
book  3 Hume concludes that the moral sense “must certainly ac- 
quire new  force, when  reflecting  on itself, it approves of  those 
principles, from whence it is deriv’d, and finds nothing but what is 
great and good in its rise and origin.”  24 The understanding, when 
it reflects on itself, falls into doubt about and so subverts itself. 
But the moral sense approves of  and so reinforces itself.  There- 
fore skepticism about the understanding is in order, but skepticism 
about morality is not. 
These  facts  suggest  that  Hume is  relying on an account  of 
normativity  that is  completely  general, applying to any kind of 
purportedly normative claim. Let me define two terms that will 
help express the view.  Call a purportedly normative judgment a 
“verdict” and the mental operation that gives rise to it a “faculty.” 
The faculty of  understanding gives rise to beliefs, which are ver- 
dicts  of  conviction.  The moral  sense gives  rise  to moral  senti- 
ments  or  verdicts  of  approval and disapproval.  The faculty of 
taste gives rise to verdicts of  beauty.  According to this theory,  a 
faculty’s verdicts are normative if  the faculty meets the following 
test:  when the faculty takes itself  and  its own operations for its 
object, it gives a positive verdict. 
2.3 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I.4.vii, pp. 267-68. 
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Now Hume clearly thinks that the understanding fails this test. 
A belief, according to Hume, is a sentiment of conviction, a lively 
idea of  the thing believed.  He argues that the harder we press the 
question whether we ought to believe our beliefs or whether they 
are likely to be true, the more the degree of our conviction -  that 
is, the liveliness or vivacity of  the ideas -  will tend to diminish. 
So the more we reason about whether reasoning is likely to lead us 
to the truth, the less confidence in the results of reasoning we will 
end up  having.25 The understanding in this way “subverts itself” 
when it reflects on its own operations. 
But the moral sense passes the reflexivity test.  In the conclu- 
sion of  the Treatise, Hume asserts that, in explaining our moral 
judgments  as  arising  from  sympathy, he has  traced  them  to  a 
“noble source”  and has given  us  a “just notion both of  the gen- 
erosity and capacity of our nature.” He  says: 
It requires but very little knowledge of  human affairs to per- 
ceive, that a sense of  morals is a principle inherent in the soul, 
and one of  the most powerful that enters into the composition. 
But this sense must certainly  acquire  new force, when reflect- 
ing on itself, it approves of  tbose principles, from whence it is 
deriv’d, and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise 
and origin. . . . not only virtue must be approv’d of, but also 
the sense of virtue.  And not only that sense, but also the prin- 
ciples from whence it is deriv’d.  So that nothing is presented 
on any side, but what is laudable and good.26 
Reflection  on  the origin  of  our moral  sentiments only serves to 
strengthen those sentiments.  The moral sense approves of its own 
origins and workings and so it approves of itself. 
I believe that Hume got the idea for this theory of normativity 
from the moral sense theorist Francis Hutcheson.  In his Illustra- 
tions on  the Moral Sense, Hutcheson  imagines a rationalist  who 
25 See  ibid.,  I.4.i, pp. 180-85. 
26 Ibid., III.3.vi,  p. 619 (my emphasis). 62  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
objects that judgments of good and evil cannot come from a moral 
sense, because we judge our senses themselves to be good or evil.27 
For instance, we approve of a benevolence-approving moral sense, 
while we would deplore a malice-approving  moral sense.  These 
judgments  would  be  trivial  if  they  came  from the benevolence- 
approving moral sense itself.  The argument is a variant on one 
familiar argument against theological voluntarism -  that if  God 
determines  what  is  good  and  evil  then  we cannot  significantly 
judge God himself  to be good -  and like that argument it is in- 
tended to drive us to realism. Hutcheson replies that the goodness of 
a sense must be assessed from some point of view from which we 
make judgments of good and bad and that we have a limited num- 
ber of  such points of  view to which we can appeal.  We  can judge 
the moral sense from the point of  view of  the moral sense itself; 
we can  judge  it from the point of  view  of  benevolence  toward 
others; or we can judge it from the point of view of  our own self- 
interest.28 What we cannot do is get outside of all of the points of 
view from which we judge things to be good or bad and still co- 
herently ask whether something is good or bad.  There is no place 
outside  of  our normative  points  of  view  from which  normative 
questions can be asked. 
The same argument can of  course be made about the norma- 
tivity of  the verdicts of  the understanding.  If  we fall into doubt 
about whether we really ought to believe what we find ourselves 
inclined to believe -  that is, if  we fall into doubt about whether 
our  beliefs are true -  we cannot  dispel the doubt by  comparing 
our beliefs to the world to see whether they are true.  We  have no 
access to the world except through the verdicts of the understand- 
ing itself, just as we have no access to the good except through the 
verdicts of  the various points of  view from which we make judg- 
ments of  goodness.  The only point of  view from which  we can 
27 Hutcheson, lllustrations on  the Moral Sense, p. 133. 
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assess the normativity of the understanding is therefore that of  the 
understanding itself. 
It is this line of  thought, I believe, that gave Hume the idea 
for the reflexivity test.  It is, of  course, complicated in the moral 
case by  the fact that there is more than one point of  view from 
which  we can assess things as good or bad.  This is what, in the 
later work, leads Hume to use the more general reflective endorse- 
ment test instead.  But we can see reflexivity and reflective endorse- 
ment as working together.  For one of  the reasons that the moral 
sense approves of  itself  is that morality contributes to our happi- 
ness, and the moral sense approves of  anything that contributes to 
people’s happiness. 
Now let’s go back  to the more general form of  the realist’s 
objection.  This was that the reflective endorsement test only shows 
that morality is extrinsically normative, whereas what we want to 
show is that it is intrinsically normative.  The addition of  the re- 
flexivity test  does  show that or, rather, shows something that is 
very close.  It shows that human nature, including our moral na- 
ture, is intrinsically normative, in a negative version of  the sense 
required by  the realist argument: there is no intelligible challenge 
that can be made to its claims.  Within human nature, morality 
can  coherently  be  challenged  from  the point  of  view  of  self- 
interest, and self-interest from the point of view of  morality. Out- 
side of  human nature, there is no normative point of  view from 
which morality can be challenged.  But morality can meet the in- 
ternal  challenge  that  is  made  from  the point  of  view  of  self- 
interest, and it also approves of  itself.  It is human nature to be 
governed by morality, and from every point of  view, including its 
own, morality earns its right to govern us.  We  have therefore no 
reason  to  reject  our nature and can  allow it to be  a law to us. 
Human nature, including moral government, is therefore norma- 
tive and has authority for us. 
Perhaps a comparison will make this thought seem more fami- 
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be virtuous is to realize our true nature, to be the best version of 
what we are.  So it is to let our own nature be a law to us.  And the 
Greeks thought  that, since our own good would be  realized  in 
being the best version of what we are, we have every reason to be 
virtuous.  Sentimentalism can be  seen as a kind of  negative  sur- 
rogate of  the teleological ethics of  the ancient world.  According 
to the sentimentalists, we have no reason not to be the best version 
of what we are. 
Bernard Williams 
This brings us to a recent attempt to revive the virtue-oriented 
ethics of  the ancient world.  In chapters 8 and 9 of Ethics and the 
Limits of  Philosophy, Bernard Williams argues that there is a con- 
trast between the kind of objectivity we can hope to find in science 
and that which we can hope to achieve in ethics.  Williams accepts 
a form of  realism  in the case of  science, but rejects it in the case 
of ethics. 
Williams frames this contrast in terms of  convergence, that is, 
in terms of  what might lead us to the best kind of  agreement.  In 
science, the ideal form of  convergence would be this: we come to 
agree with one another in our beliefs because we are all converg- 
ing on the way the world really is.  In ethics, this sort of  conver- 
gence is unavailable, and so another must be  This, as we 
will see, is where reflective endorsement comes in. 
Williams begins  by  solving a problem  in the formulation of 
his contrast.  The problem is essentially the same as the one that 
drove Hume to suppose that only a reflexivity test could establish 
the normativity  of  belief:  we can’t go outside of  our beliefs in 
order to determine whether they match the world or whether they 
correctly capture “the way the world really is.”  Williams puts the 
problem this way.  We  have a certain way of  conceptualizing the 
world, a conceptual scheme.  One thing we might mean in talking 
about “the way the world  really is” is whether we have applied 
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our concepts correctly. If we say that grass is green we have and if 
we say that it is pink we have not. This notion is unproblematic, 
but it leaves us no room to query our way of conceptualizing the 
world  itself.30  Is our conceptual scheme adequate? Is it the cor- 
rect one or the best one or the one that captures the most or the 
one that captures what is “really true” about the world? Philoso- 
phers will of course disagree on whether any of these questions are 
coherent and, if  so, which one of them is the right one to ask.  But 
since science leads us  to modify  our conceptual scheme, and we 
think of  these modifications as improvements, it does appear that 
some such question is in order. 
Williams proposes that we can capture the distinction between 
the way the world really is and the way it seems to us by the for- 
mation of a kind of  limiting conception that he calls “the ‘absolute 
conception’ of the world.” 31 The idea involves a contrast between 
concepts  that are more and less dependent on the particular per- 
spective from which we view the world.  For instance, we use color 
categories because we are visual, so color concepts like “green” 
and “pink” are dependent on something about our own perspec- 
tive.  The concept of  a certain wavelength  of  light might be less 
dependent. 
Williams  associates  two  other  properties  with  a  concept’s 
greater independence from our particular  perspectives.  First, our 
use of concepts that are more dependent on our own perspectives 
will be explained in terms of  a theory that employs concepts that 
30  It is interesting that Prichard (on pp. 14–15 of “Does Moral Philosophy Rest 
on a Mistake?”) argues that this  is correct -  there is no room to query our way of 
conceptualizing the world.  Just as the only way to resolve a doubt about whether we 
are “really obligated” -whether obligation is  normative -  is  to review the reasons 
why the action is right, so the only way to resolve a doubt about whether our beliefs 
are true is to review the reasons for those beliefs -  in the language I am using here, 
to make  sure the concept has been  applied correctly.  The problem here is  the same 
as  the one I discussed in  “Realism” in Lecture I.  By  asking the normative question 
in the form “Is my belief  really  true?”  Prichard is led to confuse it with the ques- 
tion  whether  my  concepts have been  applied  correctly.  But the normative question 
is  a  question  about  the  status  of  the  concepts,  not  about  whether  they  have been 
correctly applied. 
31 Williams,  Ethics and the Limits  of Philosophy, p. 139. 66  The Tanner Lectures  on Human Values 
are less  dependent.  So, for instance, our use  of  color concepts 
might be explained by  a theory of vision that employs wavelength 
concepts.  Relatedly,  and importantly, this  theory  (or  some yet 
more  absolute theory in which  it is  embedded)  will  also justify 
our belief  that color vision is a form of  perception, that is, a way 
of learning about the world, by the way that it explains  it.32  Color 
vision is a way of learning about the world because it gives us in- 
formation  about  wavelengths,  or  something yet  more  ultimate, 
which we take to be part of  reality.  Second, the more independent 
of  our own perspective  a concept is, the more likely it is that it 
could be shared by  investigators who were unlike us in their ways 
of  learning about the world.  Suppose that there are rational crea- 
tures  on  Jupiter  who  cannot  see colors  but  do something  more 
like  hear  them  or perhaps  feel them  in  the form of  vibrations. 
They could not use color concepts, but they might be able to use 
wavelength  concepts.  The more independent concepts  are more 
shareable. 
Williams thinks that the nearest thing we have to a conception 
of  the way the world really is is the conception of the world that 
is maximally independent of  our own perspective.  And if  we and 
the alien investigators actually began to converge on such a con- 
ception  (and of  course to  agree on what judgments  are correct 
within it) then we would have reason to believe we were converg- 
ing on what the world is really like.  This would be the best case 
of  convergence for science: our theories would come to converge 
with the theories of other investigators because all of us were con- 
verging on the way the world is. 
Now consider what the parallel would be in ethics.  Here too 
we must  deal  with  a  possible objection-namely  that there  is 
nothing analogous to perceptual  judgments in ethics.  Seeing the 
facts is one thing, and evaluating them in a certain way is another. 
This sort of argument was popular among early and mid-twentieth- 
century  emotivists  and  prescriptivists.  To counter  it, Williams 
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notices, we may appeal to the existence of what he calls “thick” as 
opposed to “thin” ethical concepts,  Thin ethical concepts -  like 
right and good and ought -  do not appear to be world-guided, in 
the sense that their application does not appear to be guided by the 
facts. Pure in their normativity, they are like those little gold stars 
you can stick on anything. But thick ethical concepts -Williams’s 
own examples are coward, lie, brutality, and gratitude -  are world- 
guided and action-guiding at the same  time.33  Only an action that is 
motivated in some way by fear can be called cowardly, and yet to 
call an action cowardly is to suggest that it ought not to be done.34 
Of course the prescriptivist or emotivist has his own account of 
these concepts.  He thinks that their world-guidedness is one thing 
and  that  their  action-guidingness is  another.  The facts tell  us 
which  actions are motivated  by fear, and when we disapprove of 
those actions or want to discourage others from doing them, we 
project our pejorative feelings onto them.  So the word “cowardly” 
is just a pejorative way of describing an act motivated by fear, used 
when we want to express our feelings or influence our neighbors. 
The difficulty with this analysis is that it suggests that it would 
be possible to use a thick ethical concept with perfect accuracy even 
if  you were completely incapable of  appreciating the value it em- 
bodies.  Williams argues  that this  is  implausible.  Of  course he 
does not mean that we can only use evaluative concepts when we 
ourselves  actually  endorse the values  in question.  But we apply 
such concepts  by  entering imaginatively into the world of  those 
who have the values, not merely by applying a set of  factual cri- 
teria.35 We  have to see the world through their eyes,  This makes 
33 Ibid., pp. 140-41. 
34  Williams says that thick concepts often provide reasons for action (or refrain- 
ing), but of  course,  strictly speaking, this is not true of  “cowardly.”  To say that an 
action is cowardly is to suggest that there is a reason not to do it but not to mention 
what that reason  is.  Something in the situation is worth overcoming human fearful- 
ness  for, but the term  doesn’t tell  us  what.  This is because  courage is  a so-called 
executive virtue. Williams’s other examples are of more directly reason-providing 
concepts. 
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it natural to think of judgments employing thick ethical concepts 
as perceptual ones.  And that in turn makes it natural to think that, 
like  other perceptual  judgments,  they  are a kind  of  knowledge. 
I say that the sky is blue, and my visitor from Jupiter says that 
it makes a humming noise.  Are we agreeing? Certainly we don’t 
mean the same thing, since I am talking about how the sky looks 
and she is talking about how it sounds.  Yet when we reflect on 
these views we find that the things we both say have implications 
that are expressible in terms of  a more absolute concept, that of 
wavelengths.  And when we look at those implications our judg- 
ments are found to converge.  Here we find grounds for confidence 
that both of  our perceptions are guiding us rightly: they are ways 
of  knowing about the world.  Now take this case.  The medicine 
man  says  that killing the black  snake will charm  away the evil 
spirit.  And we take “charming away the evil spirit” to have im- 
plications expressible in terms of what we take to be a more abso- 
lute concept, let’s say that of  curing an illness.  And probably we 
think he is wrong: killing snakes is not a way of curing illnesses.36 
What would the parallels be in ethics? They might look some- 
thing like this. The monk says that lying is sinful, and the knight 
says that it is dishonorable.  Certainly they do not mean exactly the 
same thing, for the monk is saying something about the lie’s effect 
on his  soul and about how it relates him to his  God, while the 
knight  is  saying  something about the lie’s effect  on his  reputa- 
tion -  on his  “character” in the older, more public sense of  that 
word -  and how it relates him to his social world.  But we take 
both of their remarks to have implications for what we think is a 
more absolute concept-the lie is wrong and ought not to be told —
36 He might be right, of  course. There might be some story to tell about placebo 
effects -  perhaps killing  the black snake really works because the patient believes it 
will.  Or perhaps  the patient knows  that if  killing the black snake doesn’t work the 
medicine man will try to frighten the evil spirit off  by  doing something dreadful to 
the patient, and this prospect  frightens the patient into getting well.  We  don’t know 
enough  about  medicine  to  know-and  all  that  matters  for  the  point  is  that  we 
know  roughly  how  such  stories would  have to go in order  for us  to be  convinced 
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and here we find that they converge.  And we may think, in this 
case, that the convergence  shows that their concepts  are guiding 
them toward what we take to be a moral truth or that they cor- 
rectly reflect a moral reality: say, that there are certain kinds of 
actions  that you  cannot do without  being personally  diminished 
or disfigured, and that this is related to their wrongness. 
On the other hand, suppose the knight says that he will be dis- 
honored unless  he fights a  duel with  the man who has insulted 
him.  If  we take this  to have the implication  that trying to kill 
someone who has hurt your feelings is required, or even all right, 
we shall have to disagree.  But now this is a conclusion that we 
should be uncomfortable with, and this is precisely because there 
is a world-guided side to the idea of  dishonor.  The knight’s repu- 
tation, his position in his social world, may be damaged in exactly 
the ways that he foresees and has in mind when he says he will be 
dishonored.  What is for him his identity may be diminished and 
disfigured  just as it would have been by  telling the lie.  Facts of 
this sort should give us pause about whether he is, after all, using 
the idea of  dishonor in a way  that has implications for what is 
morally right or wrong in our  sense of those words. 
Thinking about such cases may lead us to conclude that after all 
the analogy with the scientific case doesn’t hold.  We  may see the 
medicine man as trying to cause health, but we should not see the 
knight as trying to figure out what it is morally right to do.  We 
should not even, according to Williams, assume that we share with 
the knight any general sense of  what it is right or all right to do, 
about which  our views  and the knight’s both  have implications. 
Instead Williams proposes a different way in which we might look 
at the ethical beliefs of others: 
On the other model we shall see their  judgments as part of 
their way  of  living, a cultural artifact they have come to in- 
habit  (although they have not consciously built it). On this, 
nonobjectivist,  model, we shall take  a  different view  of  the 
relations between that practice and critical reflection.  We  shall 70  The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
not be disposed to see the level of  reflection as implicitly  al- 
ready there, and we shall not want to say that their judgments 
have,  just  as they  stand, these  implications  [that is, implica- 
tions about what it is right or all right to do].37 
The proposal is that we should see their values not as their best 
approximations of  the truth about value, but rather as a kind of 
habitation.  Their values form a part of  the structure of  the social 
world in which they live. 
But  this does not mean that we cannot make any evaluative 
judgments about their  values.  We can  ask whether  their  social 
world -  that is,  the world  that is  made of  those values -  is a 
good place for human beings to live.  This is still, in a broad sense, 
an ethical question, but our resources for answering it are not tied 
to any particular  system of  values.  Questions about the suitability 
of a habitat are answered with reference to the health and flourish- 
ing of the creatures who live in it.  Williams suggests that a theory 
of human nature, drawing on the resources of  the social as well as 
the physical sciences, could guide our reflections about what makes 
for human flourishing.  And those reflections in turn could enable 
us  to  assess whether  a given  system  of  values  promoted human 
flourishing.38  Williams mentions psychoanalytic theory as one such 
resource,  and of  course it is impossible not to think of  Freud in 
this context, with his gloomy view that “the cultural superego . . . 
does not trouble itself  enough about the facts of  the mental con- 
stitution of  human  beings.” 39  It does  seem natural  to  say  that 
societies in which girls wish passionately  that they had been born 
boys, or in which suicide motivated by  feelings of personal worth- 
lessness is common, or in which large segments of  the population 
are sexually dysfunctional are suffering from their values. 
Williams proposes that if  we did find that a social world pro- 
moted the best life or at least a flourishing life for human beings, 
37 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 147. 
38 Ibid., pp. 45ff, 152–53. 
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this would justify  the values embodied in that social world.  The 
structure of  justification would be very different  from the realist 
structure he thinks we can find in the case of  scientific belief.  The 
justification  would  not be  that we find  upon  reflection  that the 
values  are true or that they are reliable guides to the truth about 
morally  right action  the way colors  are reliable guides to wave- 
lengths.  Williams suggests that the only ethical belief that might 
survive at the reflective level would be the belief  “that a certain 
kind of  life was  best  for human beings.” 40  The justification  of 
other ethical beliefs would be that it is good for human beings to 
lead a life that is guided and governed by  those beliefs. 
So  far, in detailing Williams’s view, I have been  talking, as 
Williams does, as if  from the point of view of  an outside observer 
of  an  alien  society.  But  when  we imagine  this  same reflective 
exercise being carried out by  a member of  the society in question, 
it becomes clear  that the structure of  justification here is one of 
reflective  endorsement.  Hume,  as  we  saw  earlier, reverses  the 
realist ordering of  things and argues that vice is bad because we 
disapprove of  it.  In a similar way, Williams thinks that ethical 
value  is  projected  onto the world  by  our  ethical  beliefs.  Both 
would deny that it is coherent to ask whether our values are true 
independently of  our own moral or ethical sentiments.  The only 
question left to ask is whether it is good for us to have those senti- 
ments, and that question must be answered from the perspective of 
the other practical  claims our nature makes on us.  Where Hume 
establishes normativity by showing that morality is congruent with 
self-interest, Williams asserts that it would have to be established 
by congruence with human flourishing. 
Like Hume, Williams entertains the possibility  that this will 
not be the result.  But the prospect is in one way a more alarming 
one for Hume.  Hume believes that he is talking about a set of 
evaluative concepts that are deeply grounded in human nature and 
human psychology.  He supposes that, if  reflection yielded the re- 
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sult that morality is bad for the individual, the truth would have 
to  be  sunk  in  “eternal silence and oblivion” in  the  interests of 
social order.  Williams, by  contrast,  supposes that different  cul- 
tures provide us with different sets of values.  He sees the reflective 
test more as a method for choosing among them.  When cultures 
come  into  what  he  calls  “real  confrontation,”  their  members, 
forced by  that confrontation to reflect on the value of their values, 
may  lose  confidence  in  them  and  come  to  the conclusion  that 
some other values would lead to a better way of  life.4l  The result 
will not be that they will decide that their old beliefs were false, 
or even that after all they did not know what, say, sin or honor 
was.  It will be that they will stop using those concepts altogether. 
In one case, a case of  our own, this description  of  changing 
values rings true.  Consider the uneasy fate of  the evaluative con- 
cepts “masculine” and “feminine.”  People who have fallen into 
doubt about the values embodied in these concepts and the way of 
life to which  they once led us  do not argue about whether  they 
track the ethical truth.  People who have already decided against 
these  values  do not  run  around telling us  that masculinity  and 
femininity are false or wrong.  If  someone says that aggressiveness 
is  not  feminine  the  response  will  not be  that aggressiveness is 
feminine or that aggressiveness is  great.  The response  is  “Let’s 
not talk that way.”  The complaint that has been launched against 
these values is not that they were false or misleading but that they 
were straitjackets, stunting everybody’s growth.  It is that people 
who hold themselves  and others to these ideals do not flourish. 
They must therefore be abandoned or revised. 
There  is  also  an  element  of  reflexivity  in  Williams’s view. 
Williams borrows the idea that morality is a projection of human 
dispositions from Aristotle rather than from Hume. Now Aristotle 
believed  that an ethically good life must be good for the person 
whose life it is.  And Aristotle, again like Hume, has been accused 
of harboring some form of  egoism under this assumption.  In de- 
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fending Aristotle against this charge, Williams points out that the 
Aristotelian  agent will reflect on his ethical dispositions from an 
ethical point of view. Or, if he does try to reflect on his ethical 
dispositions from a point  of  view  outside of  those  dispositions, 
from the point of view of  his other needs and capacities, the im- 
portant question will be whether there is any conflict between the 
demands  of  those  needs  and capacities  and the demands  of  his 
ethical nature?’  Aristotle argued that there would not be such a 
conflict.  Again, the conclusion is that our ethical dispositions are 
judged good from every point of view that makes practical claims 
on us, including their own point of view.  And in this way norma- 
tivity is established. 
The  Reflective Agent 
Reflection, Williams tells us, can destroy knowledge.43 History 
illustrates the point, for when Bentham reflected on Hume’s theory 
of the virtues, he became a    utilitarian.44  Unfortunately, it looks 
as if  there is a clear  route from Hume to Bentham.  And it is a 
route  that  leads  through  reflection -  in particular, through  the 
reflection of agents. 
We  have seen that in Hume’s theory just actions are done from 
the motive  of  obligation.  Sympathy with  the public  interest  in- 
spires us with a sentiment of  disapproval when we think of injus- 
tice, and this motivates us  to avoid it ourselves.  Now let us con- 
sider a slightly more attractive version of  Hume’s sensible knave. 
Our knave is the lawyer  for a rich  client who has recently  died, 
leaving  his  money  to  medical  research.  In  going  through  the 
client’s papers the lawyer  discovers a will of  more recent  date, 
42 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
43 Ibid., p. 148. 
44 This is by  Bentham’s own report.  In a well-known  footnote in A  Fragment 
on  Government  (1776), Bentham  reports  that when  he read  Humes’s  Treatise, “I 
felt  as  if  the  scales had  fallen  from my  eyes”  (p. 50n).  What he learned  from 
Hume was  “that  utility was  the test  and  measure  of  all virtue; . . . and  that the 
obligation to minister  to general happiness, was an obligation paramount  to and in- 
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made  without  the  lawyer’s help  but  in  due form,  leaving  the 
money instead to the client’s worthless nephew, who will spend it 
all on beer and comic books.  The lawyer could easily suppress this 
new will, and she is tempted to do so.  She is also a student of 
Hume and believes  the theory  of  the virtues that we find  in A 
Treatise  of  Human  Nature.  So  what  does  she say  to  herself? 
Well, she says to herself  that she would disapprove of herself 
if  she did this.  She hates unjust actions and the people who per- 
form them.  But  since the lawyer knows Hume’s theory  she also 
knows  why  she would  disapprove  of  herself.  She would  disap- 
prove of  herself  because unjust  actions have a general tendency 
to bring down the system of  justice.  But she also knows that her 
distaste for such actions is caused by  their general tendency, not 
their  actual  effects.  As  Hume has  shown, our moral  sentiments 
are influenced by  “general rules.”  And our lawyer knows that this 
particular unjust action will have no actual effects but good ones. 
It will not bring  down  the system  of  justice,  and it will  bring 
much-needed money to medical research. 
The lawyer  believes  that  her  disapproval  of  this  action  de- 
pends on the fact that actions of  this kind usually have bad effects 
that this one does not have.  It is almost inconceivable that believ- 
ing this will have no effect on her disapproval  itself.  Her own 
feeling of  disapproval may seem to her to be, in this case, poorly 
grounded and therefore in a sense irrational.  And this may lead 
her to set it aside or, if  she can’t, to resist its motivational  force. 
She may say to herself: since I approve of just actions because they 
are, generally  speaking, useful, why not simply do what will be 
useful? And then of  course she is not a Humean anymore; she is 
a  utilitatarian.45 
Hume has a defense against this point, but it is a defense of 
the wrong kind.  Consider once more the original sensible knave. 
45 There  might  be  arguments  of  a  familiar  rule-utilitarian  kind  against  the 
action she is considering, but if  she is moved by  those arguments she is still now a 
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What does he lose by  his knavery?  According to Hume, he loses 
his character with himself, his pleasing sense of self-worth.  As I 
argued earlier, this  does not depend on his moral beliefs or on 
whether he endorses the claims of morality.  Since sympathy makes 
him see himself  through the eyes of others, who would disapprove 
of  him for his injustice, it will happen anyway.  But that is exactly 
the problem.  If  Hume is right, the lawyer may find that she can- 
not destroy  a valid  will  without intense  feelings of  humility  or 
self-hatred.  These may or may not be strong enough to cause her 
to desist.  But  even  if  they  are there will have been  normative 
failure.  The lawyer  does not believe  that the claims  her  moral 
feelings make on her in this case are well-grounded.  If  she could 
cure herself of them then that is what she would do. 
The difficulty in this case is not, strictly speaking, a difficulty 
with  the reflective endorsement  strategy.  It arises most immedi- 
ately from something particular to Hume’s view: the fact that the 
moral sentiments are supposed to be influenced by  “general rules,” 
rules that do not hold in every case.  Such rules cause us to dis- 
approve of  certain dispositions or character traits, which are them- 
selves tendencies of  a general kind.  But that disapproval will be 
transferred to each and every exercise of  the disposition in ques- 
tion only if we forget that the rules that cause it are merely general. 
But the difficulty does show us something important about the 
reflective endorsement method. Consider again the knavish lawyer. 
She has asked herself whether her feeling of disapproval is really a 
reason-and now I mean a normative reason-not to do the 
action, and in this case she has found that it is not.  She only dis- 
approves of  injustice because it is usually counterproductive.  But 
this act, isolated and secret, will be useful in every way.  So now 
she thinks she has a reason to do it. 
Or does she? Why should her reflection stop there? We  said 
that  she was  a  convinced  Humean, so  she  rejects  realism.  She 
therefore does not think the fact that an action is useful is in and 
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utility  is an intrinsically normative consideration.  So why should 
she be moved by  utility, any more than by  disapproval?  Perhaps 
she now finds that she is inclined to be moved by  the thought of 
utility, but that is no more a reason  than the fact that she was 
inclined  to  be  moved  by  disapproval  before.  She can  also  ask 
whether this new inclination is really a reason for action.  What is 
to stop her from continuing to ask that question, from pushing re- 
flection as far as it will go? 
If  the reflective endorsement of our dispositions is what estab- 
lishes the normativity of  those dispositions, then what we need to 
establish  the normativity  of  more particular motives and inclina- 
tions is the reflective endorsement of  those.  That after all is the 
whole point of  using the reflective endorsement method to justify 
morality:  we  are  supposing that, when we reflect  on the things 
that we find ourselves inclined to do, we can then accept or reject 
the  authority  those  inclinations  claim  over  our  conduct  and act 
accordingly. 
But what I have just described is exactly the process of thought 
that, according to Kant, characterizes the deliberations of  the au- 
tonomous  moral  agent.  According to Kant, as each impulse to 
action presents  itself  to us, we should subject it to the test of  re- 
flection, to see whether it really is a reason to act.  Since a reason is 
supposed  to  be  intrinsically  normative, we  test  a motive  to  see 
whether  it is a reason  by  determining whether we should allow 
it to be a law to us. And we do that by asking whether the maxim 
of acting on it can be willed as a law. 
Hume and Williams see the test of  reflective endorsement as a 
philosophical  exercise, used  to  establish  the  normativity  of  our 
moral dispositions and sentiments.  But according to Kant, it is not 
merely that.  The test of reflective endorsement is the test used by 
actual moral agents to establish  the normativity  of  all their par- 
ticular motives and inclinations.  So the reflective endorsement test 
is not merely a way of justifying morality.  It is morality itself. In 
the next lecture, I will elaborate this view. [KORSGAARD]  The Sources of  Normativity  77 
LECTURE III: THE AUTHORITY OF REFLECTION 
Introduction 
Over  the course of the last two  lectures I have sketched the 
way in which the normative question took shape in the debates of 
modern  moral  philosophy.  Voluntarism  tries  to  explain norma- 
tivity in what is in some sense the most natural way: we are subject 
to laws, including the laws of  morality, because we are subject to 
lawgivers.  But when we ask why we should be subject to those 
lawgivers, an infinite regress threatens.  Realism tries to block that 
regress by postulating the existence of  entities -  objective values, 
reasons, or obligations -  whose intrinsic normativity  forbids fur- 
ther questioning.  But why should we believe in these entities?  In 
the end, it seems we will be prepared to assert that such entities 
exist only because -  and only if -  we are already confident that 
the claims of morality are justified. 
The reflective endorsement theorist tries a new tack.  Morality 
is grounded in human nature.  Obligations and values are projec- 
tions of  our own moral sentiments and dispositions.  To say that 
these sentiments and dispositions are justified is not to say that they 
track the truth, but rather to say that they are good.  We are the 
better  for  having  them,  for they  perfect  our  social nature  and 
promote our self-interest. 
But  the normative  question  is one that arises in the heat of 
action.  So it is not just our dispositions, but rather the particular 
motives  and impulses  that spring from them, that must seem to 
us to be normative.  It is this line of thought that presses us toward 
Kant.  Kant, like the realist, thinks we must show that particular 
actions are right and particular ends are good.  Each impulse as it 
offers itself  to the will must pass  a kind of  test for normativity 
before we can adopt it as a reason for action.  But the test that it 
must pass is not the test of  knowledge or truth.  For Kant, like 
Hume and Williams, thinks that morality  is grounded in human 
nature and that moral properties are projections of  human dispo- 
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In what follows I will lay out the elements of a theory of nor- 
mativity.  This theory derives its main inspiration from Kant, but 
with  some modifications  that I  have  come to think  are needed. 
What I say will necessarily be sketchy, and sketchily argued.  My 
attention here will be focused on four points: first, that autonomy 
is the source of  obligation, and in particular of our ability to obli- 
gate ourselves; second, that we have moral obligations, by which 
I mean obligations to humanity  as such; third, that since we can 
obligate ourselves, we can also be obligated by  other people; and 
fourth, that we have obligations to other living things. I will have 
little to say about the content of  any of  these obligations.  And it 
will be no part of  my argument to suggest either that all obliga- 
tions are moral or that obligations can never conflict.  My aim is to 
show you where obligation comes from. Exactly which obligations 
we have and how to negotiate among them is a topic for another 
day. 
The Problem 
The human  mind  is  self-conscious.  Some philosophers  have 
supposed that this means that our minds are internally luminous, 
that their contents are completely accessible to us, that we always 
can be certain what we are thinking and feeling and wanting, and 
so  that introspection  yields  certain knowledge of  the self.  Like 
Kant, and many philosophers nowadays, I do not think that this is 
true.  Our knowledge of our own mental states and activities is no 
more certain than anything else. 
But  the human mind  is self-conscious  in  the sense that it is 
essentially  reflective.  I’m  not  talking  about  being  thoughtful, 
which of  course is an individual property, but about the structure 
of  our minds that makes  thoughtfulness possible.  A  lower ani- 
mal’s attention is fixed on the world.  Its perceptions are its beliefs 
and its desires are its will.  It is engaged in conscious activities, but 
it is not conscious of  them.  That is, they are not the objects of  its 
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ceptions and desires  themselves,  and we are conscious of  them. 
That is why we can think about them. 
And this sets us a problem no other animal has.  It is the prob- 
lem of  the normative.  For our capacity to turn our attention onto 
our  own mental activities is  also a capacity to distance ourselves 
from them and to call them into question.  I perceive, and I find 
myself  with  a powerful  impulse  to believe.  But I back  up and 
bring that impulse into view and then  I have a certain distance. 
Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. 
Shall I believe?  Is this perception  really  a reason to believe?  I 
desire  and I  find myself  with  a powerful impulse to act.  But I 
back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain 
distance.  Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a 
problem.  Shall I act? Is this desire really  a reason to act? The 
reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as 
such.  It needs a reason.  Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, 
it cannot commit itself or go forward. 
If  the problem springs from reflection then the solution must 
do so as well.  If  the problem is that our perceptions and desires 
might not withstand  reflective scrutiny, then the solution is that 
they might.  We  need reasons because our impulses must be able to 
withstand  reflective scrutiny.  We have reasons  if  they  do.  The 
normative word “reason” refers to a kind of  reflective success.  If 
“good” and “right” are also  taken  to be  intrinsically normative 
words then they too must refer to reflective success.  And they do. 
Think of  what  they  mean  when  we use  them  as  exclamations: 
“Good!” “Right!”  There they mean: I’m satisfied, I’m happy, I’m 
committed, you’ve convinced me, let’s go. They mean the work of 
reflection is done. 
“Reason” then means reflective success.  So if  I decide that my 
desire is a reason to act, I must decide that on reflection I endorse 
that desire.  And here we find the problem.  For how do I decide 
that? Is the claim that I look  at the desire and see that it is in- 
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ments  against realism  await us.  Does the desire or its object in- 
herit its normativity from something else? Then we must ask what 
makes that other thing normative, what makes it the source of  a 
reason.  And now of  course the usual regress threatens.  So what 
brings reflection to an end? 
Kant described this same problem in terms of  freedom.  It is 
because of  the reflective structure of  the mind that we must act, 
as he puts it, under the idea of  freedom.  He says, “We cannot 
conceive of  a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from 
the outside with respect to its judgments.”1 If the bidding from
outside is desire, then his point is that the reflective mind must 
endorse the desire before it can act on it — it must say to itself
that the desire is a reason. We must, as he puts it, make it our
maxim to act on the desire. And this is something we must do of 
our own free will. 
Kant defines a free will as a rational causality that is effective 
without being  determined by  any alien cause.  Anything outside 
of  the will  counts  as  an  alien  cause, including the  desires  and 
inclinations of  the  person.  The free will must  be  entirely self- 
determining.  Yet, because the will is a causality, it must act ac- 
cording to some law or other. Kant says, “Since the concept of a 
causality entails that of  laws . . . it follows that freedom is by  no 
means lawless . . .” 2 Alternatively, we may say that since the will
is practical  reason, it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing 
for no reason.  Since reasons are derived from principles, the free 
will must have a principle.  But because the will is free, no law 
or principle can be imposed on it from outside.  Kant concludes 
that the will must be autonomous:  that is, it must have its own 
law or principle.  And here again we arrive at the problem.  For 
where is this law to come from? If  it is imposed on the will from 
outside then the will is not free.  So the will must adopt the law 
1 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 448; in Beck's translation, 
p. 66.
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for itself.  But until the will has a law or principle, there is nothing 
from which it can derive a reason.  So how can it have any reason 
for adopting one law rather than another ? 
Well, here is Kant’s answer.  The Categorical imperative tells 
us to act only on a maxim that we could will to be a law.  And 
this, according to Kant, is the law of  a free will.  To see why, we 
need  only compare  the problem  faced by  the free will with the 
content of  the Categorical imperative.  The problem  faced by  the 
free will is this: the will must have a law, but because the will is 
free, it must be its own law.  And nothing determines what that 
law must be. All that it has to be is a law. Now consider the 
content of the Categorical imperative. The Categorical imperative 
simply tells us to choose a law.  Its only constraint on our choice is 
that it have the form of  a law.  And nothing determines what that 
law must be. All that it has to  be is a law. 
Therefore the categorical imperative is the law of  a free will. 
It does not impose any external constraint on the free will’s activi- 
ties,  but  simply  arises  from the nature of  the will.  It describes 
what a free will must do in order to be what it is.  It must choose 
a maxim it can regard as a law.3 
Now I’m going to make a distinction that Kant doesn’t make. 
I am going to call the law of  acting only on maxims you can will 
to be laws “the Categorical imperative.”  And I am going to dis- 
tinguish it from what I will call “the moral law.”  The moral law, 
in the Kantian system, is the law of what Kant calls the Kingdom 
of  Ends, the republic of  all rational beings.  The moral law tells 
us to act only on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act 
on together  in a workable cooperative system.  Now the Kantian 
argument that I have just described establishes that the categorical 
imperative is the law of a free will.  But it does not establish that 
the moral law is the law of a free will. Any law is universal, but
3This is a reading of the argument Kant gives in ibid., pp. 446–48; in Beck’s 
translation, pp. 64-67; and in The Critique of Practical Reason under the heading 
“Problem II,” p. 29; in Becks translation, pp. 28-29. It is explained in greater 
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the argument doesn’t settle the question of the domain over which 
the law of  the free will must range.  And there are various possi- 
bilities here.  If  the law is the law of  acting on the desire of  the 
moment, then the agent will treat each desire as it arises as a rea- 
son, and her conduct will be that of a  wanton.4  If the law ranges 
over the interests of an agent’s whole life, then the agent will be 
some sort of egoist.  It is only if  the law ranges over every rational 
being that the resulting law will be the moral law, the law of the 
Kingdom of Ends. 
Because of  this, it has sometimes been claimed that the cate- 
gorical  imperative  is an empty  formalism.  And this in turn has 
been conflated with another claim, that the moral law is an empty 
formalism. Now that second claim is  false.5 But it is true that the 
argument that shows that we are bound by the categorical impera- 
tive does not show that we are bound by the moral law.  For that 
we need another step.  The agent must think of herself  as a Citizen 
of the Kingdom of Ends. 
The Solution 
Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous 
and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is 
appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct 
encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind 
4 I have a reason for saying that her behavior will be that of a wanton rather
than simply saying that she will be a wanton. Harry Frankfurt, from whom I am 
borrowing the term, defines a wanton as someone who has no second-order volitions. 
An  animal, whose  desire is  its will,  is  a wanton.  I  am arguing here that a person 
cannot  be  like  that,  because  of  the  reflective  structure of  human  consciousness.  A 
person must act on a reason,  and so the person who acts like a wanton must be treat- 
ing the desire of  the moment  as  a reason.  That commits  her  to the principle  that 
the desire of  the moment is a reason, and her commitment to that principle counts as 
a second-order  volition.  See Frankfurt, “Freedom of  the Will and  the Concept of  a 
Person,”  especially  the  discussion  on  pp.  16-19,  The affinity of  my  account  with 
Frankfurt’s will be evident. 
5 Bradley and others understood Hegel’s famous objection  this way,  and if  it is 
taken  this  way  it is  a  mistake.  I  argue for  this in  my  paper  “Kant’s Formula  of 
Universal Law.”  In that paper, however, I do not distinguish the categorical impera- 
tive from the moral law, and my  arguments there actually only show that the moral 
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has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different rea- 
son.  The reflective  structure of  the mind  is  a  source of  “self- 
consciousness” because it forces us  to have  a conception of  our- 
selves.  As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be 
reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a meta- 
physical  self.  From  a third person point of  view, outside of  the 
deliberative  standpoint,  it may  look  as  if  what  happens  when 
someone makes  a  choice is  that the strongest  of  his  conflicting 
desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliber- 
ate.  When you  deliberate, it is  as if  there were something over 
and above  all  of  your  desires,  something that is  you, and that 
chooses which  desire to act on.  This means that the principle or 
law by  which you determine your actions is one that you regard as 
being expressive of yourself.  To identify with such a principle or 
law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6
An agent might think of herself  as a Citizen in the Kingdom 
of  Ends.  Or she might think of  herself  as a member of  a family 
or an ethnic group or a nation.  She might think of  herself  as the 
steward of  her own interests, and then she will be an egoist.  Or 
she might think of  herself  as the slave of  her passions, and then 
she will be  a wanton.  And how she thinks of herself  will deter- 
mine whether it is the law of  the Kingdom of  Ends, or the law of 
some smaller group, or the law of  the egoist, or the law of  the 
wanton that is the law that she is to herself. 
The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theo- 
retical one, a view about what as a matter of  inescapable scientific 
fact you are.  It is better understood as a description under which 
you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to 
be worth  living and your  actions to be worth undertaking.  So  I 
will  call  this  a  conception  of  your  practical  identity.  Practical 
identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will 
be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman 
or a man, an adherent of  a certain religion, a member of  an ethnic 
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group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities 
give  rise  to reasons  and obligations.  Your reasons express your 
identity, your nature  ; your obligations spring from what that iden- 
tity forbids. 
Our ordinary ways of  talking about obligation reflect this con- 
nection  to  identity.  A  century  ago a European  could  admonish 
another to civilized behavior by telling him to act like a Christian. 
It is still true in many quarters that courage is urged on males by 
the injunction “Be a man!”  Duties more obviously connected with 
social roles  are of  course enforced  in this way.  “A psychiatrist 
doesn’t violate  the  confidence of  her  patients.”  No  “ought” is 
needed  here because the normativity is  built right into the role. 
But it isn’t only in the case of  social roles that the idea of obliga- 
tion  invokes  the  conception  of  practical  identity.  Consider  the 
astonishing but familiar “I couldn’t live with myself if I did that.” 
Clearly there are two selves here, me and the one I must live with 
and so must not fail.  Or consider the protest  against obligation 
ignored : “Just who do you think you are ?” 
The connection  is  also  present  in  the  concept  of  integrity. 
Etymologically,  integrity  is  oneness,  integration  is  what  makes 
something one.  To be a thing, one thing, a unity, an entity; to be 
anything at all: in the metaphysical sense, that is what it means to 
have integrity.  But we use the term for someone who lives up to 
his own standards.  And that is because we think that living up to 
them  is what makes him  one, and so what makes him a person 
at all. 
It is the conceptions of  ourselves that are most important to us 
that give rise to unconditional obligations.  For to violate them is 
to lose your integrity and so your identity, and no longer to be who 
you  are.  That is, it is  no longer to be able to think of  yourself 
under  the description  under  which  you  value yourself  and find 
your life worth living and your  actions worth undertaking.  That 
is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead.  When 
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part of one’s identity, and an agent would rather be dead, then the 
obligation not to do it is unconditional  and complete.  If  reasons 
arise from reflective endorsement, then obligation arises from re- 
flective rejection. 
But  the question  how  exactly  an agent should  conceive her 
practical identity, the question which law she should be to herself, 
is not settled by  the arguments I have given.  So moral obligation 
is not yet on the table.  To that extent the argument is formal, and 
in one sense empty. 
But in another sense it is not empty at all. What we have estab- 
lished is this.  The reflective structure of  human consciousness re- 
quires that you identify yourself  with some law or principle that 
will govern your choices.  It requires you to be a law to yourself. 
And that is the source of normativity.  So the argument shows just 
what Kant said  that it did:  that our  autonomy is  the source of 
obliga  tion. 
It will help to put the point in Joseph Butler’s terms, in terms 
of the distinction between power and authority.  We  do not always 
do what upon reflection we would do or even what upon reflection 
we have already decided to do. Reflection does not have irresistible 
power over us.  But when we do reflect we cannot but think that 
we ought to do what on reflection we conclude we have reason to 
do. And when we don’t do that we punish ourselves, by  guilt and 
regret and repentance and remorse.  We  might say that the acting 
self concedes to the thinking self its right to government.  And the 
thinking self, in turn, tries to govern as well as it can.  So the re- 
flective  structure of  human  consciousness  establishes  a  relation 
here, a relation that we have to ourselves.  And it is a relation not 
of  mere power but rather of authority.  And that is the authority 
that is the source of obligation. 
Notice that this means that voluntarism is true after all.  The 
source of obligation is a legislator, one whose authority is beyond 
question  and does not need  to be established.  But there is only 
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will.7 So Pufendorf  and Hobbes were right.  It is not the bare fact 
that it would be a good idea to perform a certain action that obli- 
gates us to perform it.  It is the fact that we command ourselves 
to do what we find it would be a good idea to do. 
One more step is necessary.  The acting self  concedes to the 
thinking self its right to govern.  But the thinking self in turn must 
try to govern well.  It is its job to make what is in any case a good 
idea  into law.  How do we  know what is  a good idea or what 
should  be  a  law?  Kant proposes  that we  can  tell  whether  our 
maxims  should  be  laws  by  attending not  to their  matter but to 
their form. 
To  understand this idea, we need to return to its origins, which 
are in Aristotle.  According to Aristotle, a thing is composed of  a 
form  and a matter.  The matter is the material, the parts, from 
which it is made.  The form of  a thing is its functional arrange- 
ment.  That is, it is the arrangement of  the matter or of  the parts 
that enables the thing to serve its purpose, to do whatever it does. 
For example, the purpose of a house is to be a shelter, so the form 
of  a house is the way  the arrangement of  the parts-the walls 
and the roof -  enables it to serve as a shelter.  “Join the walls at 
the corner, put the roof on top, and that’s how we keep the weather 
out.” That is the form of a house.8 
Next  consider  the maxim  of  an action.  Since  every  human 
action is done for an end, a maxim has two parts, the act and the 
end. The form of the maxim is the arrangement of its parts. Take, 
for instance, Plato’s famous example of the three  maxims.9
1. I will keep my weapon, because I want it for myself. 
7 This remark  needs  a  qualification,  which  springs  from  the  fact  that we can 
unite our wills  with the wills  of  others.  In Kant’s  theory,  this happens  when we 
are citizens who  together form a general will or when we make friends or get mar- 
ried.  In those cases it is sometimes the united will that has authority over our con- 
duct.  For  further  discussion,  see my  “Creating  the Kingdom  of  Ends:  Reciprocity 
and Responsibility  in Personal Relations.” 
8 These views are found throughout Aristotle’s writings,  but centrally discussed 
in books VII-IX of the Metaphysics and in On the Soul. 
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2. I will  refuse to return your weapon, because I want it for 
3.  I will refuse to return your weapon, because you have gone 
Maxims 1  and 3 are good; maxim 2 is bad.  What makes them so? 
Not the actions,  for maxims 2  and 3 have the same actions; not 
the purposes, for maxims 1 and 2 have the same purposes.  The 
goodness does not rest in the parts; but rather in the way the parts 
are combined and related; so the goodness does not rest in the 
matter,  but  rather  in the form  of  the maxim.  But  form is not 
merely the arrangement of  the parts; it is the functional arrange- 
ment -  the arrangement that enables the thing to do what it does. 
If the walls are joined and roof placed on top so that the building 
can  keep  the weather out, then  the building has  the form of  a 
house.  So: if  the action and the purpose are related to one another 
so that the maxim can be willed as a law, then the maxim is good. 
Notice what this establishes.  A good maxim is good in virtue 
of its internal structure.  Its internal structure, its form, makes it fit 
to be willed as a law.  A good maxim is therefore an intrinsically 
normative entity. So realism is true after all, and Nagel, in par- 
ticular, was right.  When an impulse presents itself to us, as a kind 
of  candidate for being a reason, we look to see whether it really 
is a reason, whether its claim to normativity is true. 
But this isn’t an exercise of intuition or a discovery about what 
is out there in the world.  The test for determining whether  an 
impulse is a reason is whether we can will the maxim of acting on 
that impulse as law.  So the test is a test of  endorsement. 
This completes the first part of  my  argument, so let me sum 
up what I’ve said.  What I have shown so far is why there is such 
a thing as obligation. The reflective structure of human conscious- 
ness forces us to act for reasons.  At the same time, and relatedly, 
it forces us to have a conception of our own identity, a conception 
that identifies us with the source of  our reasons.  In this way, it 
makes us laws to ourselves.  When an impulse presents itself to us 
myself. 
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we ask whether it could be a reason.  We  answer that question by 
seeing whether the maxim of  acting on it can be willed as a law 
by  a being with the identity in question.  If  it can be willed as a 
law, it is a reason, for it has an intrinsically normative structure. 
If  it cannot be willed as a law, we must reject it, and in that case 
we get obligation. 
A moment  ago I said that realism is true after all.  But that 
could be misleading.  That we obligate ourselves is simply a fact 
about human nature.  But whether a maxim can serve as a law still 
depends upon the way that we think of  our identities.  So there is 
still an element of  relativism in the system.  In order to establish 
that there are moral obligations we will need another step. 
Moral Obligation 
There is another way to make the points I have been making, 
and in approaching the problem of  relativism it will be helpful to 
employ it.  We  can take as our model the way Rawls employs the 
concept/conception  distinction in  A  Theory of Justice. There, the 
concept  of  justice refers  to  a problem,  the problem of  how the 
benefits of  social cooperation are to be distributed.  A conception 
of  justice  is  a  principle  that is  proposed  as  a  solution  to  that 
prob1em.l0 
In the  same  way,  the  most  general  normative  concepts,  the 
right and the good, are names for problems -  for the normative 
problems that spring from our reflective nature.  “Good” names 
the problem of  what we are to strive for, aim for, and care about 
in our lives.  “Right” names the more specific problem of what we 
are  to  do.  The “thinness”  of  these terms,  to use  Bernard Wil- 
liams’s language, comes from the fact that they are only concepts, 
names for whatever it is that solves the problems in question. 
How do we get from concepts to conceptions? What mediates 
is  a  conception  of  practical  identity.  In  Rawls’s argument, we 
move from concept to conception by  taking up the standpoint of 
10 Rawls, A Theory  of  Justice, p. 5. [KORSGAARD] The Sources of  Normativity  89 
the pure citizen and asking what principles such a citizen would 
have reason to adopt.  In Kant’s argument, we move from concept 
to conception by  taking up the standpoint of a Citizen in the King- 
dom of  Ends and asking what principles that citizen would have 
reason to adopt. 
Because they are normative, thick ethical concepts stand to thin 
ones  as  conceptions  to concepts.  They represent  solutions, or at 
least reasons that will be weighed in arriving at solutions, to the 
problems that are set by  reflection.  And that means that they em- 
body  a view  about  what is right or good.  If  this is  right, then 
Williams is wrong to say that reflection is not inherent in, or al- 
ready implied by, thick ethical  concepts.11  As normative concepts, 
they are essentially reflective. 
Furthermore,  our  thin  ethical  concepts,  although  not neces- 
sarily our thick ones, will be shared with those alien scientific in- 
vestigators.12  For  the  fact  that  they  are  scientific investigators 
means that they have asked themselves what they ought to believe 
and that they have  decided  that the question is worth pursuing. 
And that in turn means that they are rational and social beings, 
who face normative problems like our own and sometimes solve 
them.  The exact shape of  their problems  may be different from 
ours, and so they may have different conceptions.  But if  we can 
see their conceptions  as solutions to the normative problems that 
they face, there will even be a kind of convergence. 
But this does not eliminate the element of relativism that Wil- 
liams has sought to preserve.  The mediation between concepts and 
conceptions comes by way of  practical identity.  And human iden- 
tity has been differently constituted in different social worlds.  Sin, 
dishonor, and moral wrongness all represent conceptions of  what 
one cannot do without being diminished or disfigured, without loss 
of  identity,  and therefore conceptions  of  what one must not do. 
But they belong to different worlds in which human beings thought 
11 See “Bernard Williams” in Lecture II. 
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of themselves and of  what made them themselves in very different 
ways.  Where sin is the conception, my  identity is my  soul and it 
exists in the eyes of  my  God.  Where dishonor is the conception, 
my identity is my reputation, my position in some small and know- 
able social world.  The conception of moral wrongness as we now 
understand  it belongs  to the world  we  live in, the one brought 
about by  the Enlightenment, where one’s identity is one’s relation 
to humanity itself.  Hume said at the height of  the Enlightenment 
that to  be virtuous  is  to think of  yourself  as a member  of  the 
“party of  humankind, against  vice  or  disorder, its common en- 
emy.” l3 And that is now true. But we coherently can grant that 
it was not always so. 
But this is not to say that there is nothing to be said in favor 
of  the Enlightenment  conception.  This sort of  relativism  has its 
limits,  and  they  come  from  two  different  but  related  lines  of 
thought. 
We have  already  seen  one of  them  set forward by  Bernard 
Williams.  We  could, with the resources of  a knowledge of human 
nature, rank different sets of  values according to their tendency to 
promote human flourishing.  If  values are associated with ways of 
thinking of  what we most fundamentally are, then the point will 
be that some ways of  conceiving one’s identity are healthier  and 
better for us than others. 
But it is also important to remember that no argument can pre- 
serve any form of  relativism without on another level eradicating 
it.  This is one of  the main faults with one well-known criticism 
of liberalism, that the conception of  the person that is employed 
in its arguments is an “empty  self.”I4 It is urged by communi- 
tarians  that people need  to conceive themselves  as members  of 
smaller communities, essentially tied to particular others and tra- 
ditions.  This is  an argument  about how human  beings need to 
constitute our practical  identities, and if  it is successful what it 
13 Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles  of  Morals, p. 275. 
14 See, for instance, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits  of  Justice. [KORSGAARD] The Sources of Normativity  91 
establishes is a universal fact, namely that our practical identities 
must  be  constituted  in part  by  particular ties  and commitments. 
And the communitarian who has reflected  and reached  this con- 
clusion now has a conception of his own identity that is universal: 
he is an animal that needs to live in community. 
And there  is  a further implication  of  this that is  important. 
Once the communitarian  sees himself  this way, his particular  ties 
and commitments will remain normative for him only if  this more 
fundamental  conception of  his identity is one that he can see as 
normative as well. A further stretch of  reflection requires a further 
stretch of  endorsement.  So he must endorse this new view of his 
identity.  He is an animal that needs to live in community, and he 
now takes this to be a normative identity.  He treats it as a source 
of reasons, for he argues that it matters that he gets what he needs. 
And  this  further stretch  of  endorsement  is  exactly what occurs. 
Someone who is moved to urge the value of having particular ties 
and  commitments  has  discovered  that part of  their  normativity 
comes from the fact that human beings need to have them.  He 
urges that our lives are meaningless without them.  That is not a 
reason that springs from one of  his own particular  ties and com- 
mitments.  It is a plea on behalf  of  all human beings.  And that 
means that he is no longer immersed in a normative world of  par- 
ticular  ties  and commitments.  Philosophical  reflection  does  not 
leave everything just where it was. 
This is just a fancy new model  of  an argument that first ap- 
peared in a much simpler form, Kant’s argument for his Formula 
of Humanity.  The form of  relativism with which Kant began was 
the most elementary one we encounter -  the relativity of value to 
human desires and interests.  He started from the fact that when 
we make a choice we must regard its object as good. His point is 
the one I have been making -  that being human we must endorse 
our impulses before we can  act on them.  Kant asked what it is 
that makes these objects good, and, rejecting one form of realism, 
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Were it not for our desires  and inclinations, we would not find 
their objects good.  Kant saw that we take things to be important 
because they are important to us -  and he concluded that we must 
therefore take ourselves to be important.  In this way, the value of 
humanity itself is implicit in every human  choice.15 If normative 
skepticism is to be avoided -  if  there is any such thing as a reason 
for action -  then humanity as the source of all reasons and values 
must be valued for its own sake.16 
The point I want to make now is the same.  In this lecture I 
have offered an account of the source of normativity. I have argued 
that a human being is an animal who needs a practical conception 
of  her own identity, a conception of  who she is that is normative 
for her.  Otherwise she could have no reasons to act, and since she 
is reflective she needs reasons to act.  But you are a human being 
and so if  you believe my  argument you can now see that this is 
your identity.  You are an animal of the sort I have just described. 
And that is not merely  a contingent conception  of  your identity, 
which  you  have constructed or chosen for yourself  or could con- 
ceivably reject.  It is simply the truth.  Now that you see that your 
need to have a normative conception of  yourself  comes from the 
sort  of  animal  you  are, you  can  ask  whether  it really  matters 
whether animals of  this kind conform to their normative practical 
identities.  Does it really matter what human beings do ?  And here 
you have no option but to say yes.  Since you are human you must 
take something to be normative, that is, some conception of practi- 
cal identity must be normative for you.  If  you had no normative 
conception of  your identity, you could have no reasons for action, 
15 Kant, Foundations  of  the Metaphysics  of  Morals, pp. 427-28; in Beck‘s trans- 
lation, pp. 45-47. I am here summarizing the interpretation of this argument I give 
in “Kant’s Formula of  Humanity.” 
16 This  implies that you must  accept the laws that arise from this more funda- 
mental view  of  your  identity, the  laws  of  morality.  But it does  not imply  that the 
less  fundamental  laws  no  longer  exist  or  that  the more  fundamental  ones  always 
trump  them.  The view I  have as I have spelled it out so far leaves room  for con- 
flict.  Some account of  how such conflicts might be negotiated is desirable, but I do 
not mean to be giving or implying any such account here. [KORSGAARD]  The Sources  of  Normativity 93 
and because your consciousness is reflective, you could then not act 
at all.  Since you cannot act without reasons and your humanity is 
the source of  your reasons, you must endorse your own humanity 
if you are to act at all. 
It follows from this argument that human beings are valuable. 
Enlightenment morality is true. 
Obligating One  Another 
So far I have argued that the reflective structure of human con- 
sciousness gives us legislative authority over ourselves. That is why 
we are able to obligate ourselves.  And just now I argued that once 
we understand how all of  this works, we must concede that our 
humanity  is an end in itself, that human nature as the source of 
our values is itself  a value.  This, I should add, is what gives rise 
to moral obligation. 
You  might suppose  that I  am claiming  that  this  settles the 
question of  our obligations to others.  Since I regard my humanity 
as a source of value, I must in the name of consistency regard your 
humanity that way as well.  So  I must value the things that you 
value.  Or, to put it another way,  since I think my  humanity is 
what makes my desires into normative reasons, I must suppose that 
the humanity of  others makes their desires into normative reasons 
as well. 
This is a familiar form of argument.  Versions of  it appear in 
Thomas Nagel’s book  The Possibility of  Altruism, and in Alan 
Gewirth’s book  Reason  and Morality.  And the criticism of  this 
form of argument is always the same.  Consistency can force me to 
grant that your humanity is normative for you just as mine is nor- 
mative for me.  It can force me to acknowledge that your desires 
have the status of  reasons  for you, in exactly the same way that 
mine do for me.  But it does not force me to share in your reasons 
or make your humanity normative for  me.17  It could still be true 
17 See  for instance Williams’s criticism  of  Gewirth in chapter 4  of  Ethics  and 
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that I have my  reasons and you have yours, and indeed that they 
leave us eternally at  odds.18 Human beings might be egoistic, not 
in the sense of being concerned only about themselves, but in the 
sense defined by Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism. The egoist 
thinks that reasons are a kind of private property.  We  each act on 
our own  private reasons,  and we need  some special reason,  like 
friendship or contract, for taking the reasons of others into account. 
In one sense this objection is correct.  Consistency is not what 
forces us to share our reasons.  And even if  these arguments did 
work, they would work in the wrong way.  They would show that 
I have an obligation to myself to treat you in ways that respect the 
value that I place on you.  But they would not show that I have 
obligations to you. So we need something more. 
As we have seen, I can obligate myself  because I am conscious 
of myself.  So if you are going to obligate me I must be conscious 
of you.  You must be able to intrude on my reflections -  you must 
be able to get under my skin. People suppose that practical reasons 
are private because they suppose that reflection is a private activity. 
And they suppose that, in turn, because they believe in the privacy 
of consciousness.  So what we need at this point is some help from 
Wittgenstein. 
Consider the private language argument.  As Wittgenstein de- 
fines it, a private language would be a language that referred to 
something essentially private and incommunicable, say for instance 
a  sensation  that is yours  alone,  and cannot be described in any 
other way than by  a name that you give to it.  You can’t even call 
it a tickle or an itch, for then it would be communicable.  So you 
just call it ‘S.’ And whenever you experience it, you say to your- 
self, “That was S.’’ 19 
Wittgenstein argues that there couldn’t be any such language. 
One way to understand  his  argument goes like this:  Meaning is 
18 In contemporary jargon, the objection is that the reasons the argument reveals 
19 See Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations, §§243ff.,  pp.  88ff. 
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relational because it is a normative notion: to say that X means Y 
is to say that one ought to take X for Y; and this requires two, a 
legislator to lay it down that one ought to take X for Y and a citi- 
zen  to obey.  And the relation  between these two is not merely 
causal because the citizen can disobey: there must be a possibility 
of  misunderstanding or mistake.  Since it is  a relation  in which 
one gives a law to another, it takes two to make a meaning.  So 
you  cannot  peer  inwardly  at  an  essentially  private  and  incom- 
municable sensation  and say, “That is what I mean by  S” and so 
in that way mean something.  For if  that is what you mean by S, 
then  when you  call something S it must be that, and if  you call 
something else S you must be wrong.  But if what you call S is just 
that sensation that makes you feel like saying “S,” and it cannot be 
identified in any other way, then you cannot be wrong.”  The  idea of 
a private language is inconsistent with the normativity of meaning. 
If we read Wittgenstein that way, there is an obvious similarity 
between  the kind of  normativity that he thinks characterizes  lan- 
guage and the kind of  normativity that I have been attributing to 
practical  reasons.  We could  make  a  parallel  argument  against 
private reasons: Reasons are relational because reason is a norma- 
tive notion: to say that R is a reason for A is to say that one should 
do A  because  of  R; and this requires two, a legislator  to lay  it 
down and a citizen to obey.  And the relation between them is not 
just causal because the citizen can disobey: there must be a possi- 
bility of irrationality or wrongdoing.  Since it is a relation in which 
one gives a law to another, it takes two to make a reason.  And 
here the two are the two elements of  reflective consciousness, the 
thinking self  and the active self: what I have been talking about 
all along is how you can make laws and reasons for your self.21 
20 See especially ibid., §258, p. 92: “But ‘I impress it on myself’ can only mean: 
this  process brings it about that I remember  the connection  right in the future,  But 
in the present case I have no criterion of  correctness.  One would  like to  say:  what- 
ever is going to seem right to me is right.  And that only means that here we cannot 
talk about ‘right.’ ” 
21 It may  look as  if there is a disanalogy here.  The private language argument 
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There are two important points here.  The first point is that the 
mistake involved in thinking that a meaning is a mental entity is 
exactly like that involved in thinking that a reason or a value is a 
mental entity.  To talk about reasons and meanings is not to talk 
about entities, but to talk in a shorthand way about relations we 
have with ourselves and one another.  The normative demands of 
meaning  and reason  are not  demands  that  are made on us  by 
objects, but are demands that we make on ourselves and each other. 
The second point concerns privacy. The private language argu- 
ment does not show that I could not have my own personal lan- 
guage.  It shows that I could not have a language that is in prin- 
ciple incommunicable to anybody else.  When I make a language, 
I make its meanings normative for me.  As Wittgenstein puts it, 
I undertake to use words in certain ways.” And however I go 
about binding myself to those meanings, it must be possible for me 
to bind another in exactly the same way. 
If  I say to you, “Picture a yellow spot!” you will. What exactly 
is happening? Are you simply cooperating with me? No, because 
at least without a certain active resistance you will not be able to 
help it.  Is it a causal connection then? No, or at least not merely 
that, for if you picture a pink spot you will be mistaken, wrong. 
Causal connections  cannot be wrong.  What kind of  necessity is 
this, both normative and compulsive? It is obligation. 
Philosophers have been concerned for a long time about how 
we  understand  the meanings  of  words,  but  we have  not  paid 
enough attention to the fact that it is so hard not to.  It is nearly 
impossible  to hear  the words  of  a  language you  know  as mere 
noise.  And this has implications for the supposed privacy of hu- 
man consciousness.  For it means that I can always intrude myself 
because then you could not be wrong.  The remark  I  just made makes it look  as  if 
you  could  have  a reason  just  now  and  never  again-  the  thinking self  could  bind 
the acting self to act a certain way just now.  Actually, however,  I do not think that 
is  a  possibility,  since  the  acting  self  cannot  coherently  be  taken  to  exist  just  at a 
particular  moment.  See my  “Personal Identity and the Unity of  Agency:  A Kantian 
Response to Parfit,” pp. 113-14. 
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into your consciousness. All I have to do is talk to you in the words 
of  a language you know, and in this way I can force you to think. 
The space of  linguistic consciousness is essentially  public, like a 
town square.  You might happen to be alone in yours, but I can get 
in  anytime.  Wittgenstein  says,  “Think  in  this  connection  how 
singular is the use of a person’s name to call him.” 23 
If I call out your name, I make you stop in your tracks.  (If you 
love me, I make you come running.)  Now you cannot proceed as 
you did before.  Oh, you can proceed, all right, but not just as you 
did before.  For now if  you walk on, you will be ignoring me and 
slighting me.  It will  probably be difficult for you,  and you will 
have to muster a certain active resistance, a sense of  rebellion.  But 
why should you have to rebel against me? It is because I am a law 
to you.  By  calling out your name, I have obligated you.  I have 
given you a reason to stop.24 
Of  course you might not stop. You have reasons of your own, 
and you might decide, rightly or wrongly, that they outweigh the 
one I have given you.  But that I have given you a reason is clear 
from the fact that, in ordinary circumstances, you will feel like giv- 
ing me one back. “Sorry, I must run, I’m late for an appointment.” 
We all know that reasons must be met with reasons, and that is 
why we are always exchanging them. 
We  do not seem to need a reason to take the reasons of  others 
into account.  We seem to need a reason not to.  Certainly we do 
things because others want us to, ask us to, tell us to, all the time. 
We  give each other the time and directions, open doors and step 
aside, warn  each other of  imminent perils large and small.  We 
respond  with the alacrity of  obedient soldiers to telephones  and 
doorbells and cries for help.  You could say that it is because we 
want to be cooperative, but that is like saying that you understand 
23 Ibid., §27, p. 13. 
24 More strictly speaking, the needs and demands of others present us with what 
Kant  calls  “incentives,”  just  as  our own  inclinations  do.  Incentives  come  up  for 
automatic consideration  as candidates for  being  reasons.  I  thank  Ulrike Heuer  for 
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my words because you want to be cooperative.  It ignores the same 
essential point, which is that it is so hard not to. 
Now the egoist may reply that this does not establish that other 
people’s reasons are reasons for me.  He’ll say that I am merely 
describing a deep psychological fact -  that human beings are very 
susceptible to one another’s pressure.  We tend to cave in to the 
demands of  others.  But nothing I have said so far shows that we 
have to treat the demands of  others as reasons.  It is at this point 
that Thomas Nagel’s argument, from The Possibility of Altruism, 
comes into its own. 
Suppose that we are strangers and that you are tormenting me, 
and suppose that I call upon you to stop.  I say, “How would you 
like it if  someone did that to you?” Now you cannot proceed as 
you did before.  Oh, you can proceed all right, but not just as you 
did before.  For I have obligated you to stop. 
How does the obligation come about? Just the way that Nagel 
says that it does.  I invite you to consider how you would like it if 
someone did that to you.  You realize that you would not merely 
dislike it, you would resent it.  You would think that the other has 
a reason to stop-more, that he has an obligation to stop.  And 
that obligation would spring from your own objection to what he 
does to you. You make yourself an end for others; you make yourself 
a law to them.  But if you are a law to others insofar as you are just a 
person, just someone, then others are also laws to  By  making 
you think these thoughts, I force you to acknowledge the value of 
my  humanity, and I obligate you  to act in a way that respects it. 
As Nagel observes, the argument does not go through if  you 
fail to see yourself, to identify yourself, as just someone, a person, 
one person  among others who are equally  The argument 
invites you to change places with the other, and you cannot do this 
if  you  fail to see what you  and the other have in common.  Sup- 
pose you could say, “Someone doing that to me, why that would be 
25 See Nagel,  The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 82-84. 
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terrible!  But then I am me, after all.”  Then the argument would 
fail of its effect; it would not find a foothold in you.  But the argu- 
ment never really fails in  that way. 
For it to fail in that way, I would have  to hear your words as 
mere noise, not as intelligible speech. And it is impossible to hear 
the words of  a language you know as mere noise.  In hearing your 
words as words, I acknowledge that you are someone.  In acknowl- 
edging that I can hear  them, I acknowledge that I am someone. 
If I listen to the argument at all, I have already admitted that each 
of us is someone. 
Consider  an  exchange  of  reasons.  A  student comes to your 
office door and says, “I need to talk to you.  Are you free now?” 
You say, “No, I’ve got to finish this letter right now and then I’ve 
got to go home.  Could you possibly come around tomorrow, say 
about three?” And your student says, “Yes, that will be fine.  I’ll 
see you tomorrow at three then.” 
What is happening here? On my view, the two of you are rea- 
soning together, to arrive at a decision, a single shared decision, 
about what to do.  And I take that to be the natural view.  But if 
egoism is true, and reasons cannot be shared, then that is not what 
is happening.  Instead, each of  you backs into the privacy of  his 
practical consciousness, reviews his own reasons, comes up with a 
decision, and then reemerges to announce the result to the other. 
And the process  stops when  the results  happen to coincide, and 
the agents know it, because of the announcements they have made 
to each other. 
Now consider  an exchange of  ideas, rather than an exchange 
of practical reasons.  Here we do not find these two possibilities. 
If  meanings could not be  shared, there would be no point in an- 
nouncing the results of one’s private thinking to anybody else.  If 
they  can  be  shared, then  it is  in principle  possible  to think  the 
issues  through  together, and  that is what people  do when  they 
talk.  But if  we have to grant that meanings can be shared, why 
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The egoist may  reply  that I am leaving out an option.  The 
student/teacher  relation is a personal one.  People who enter into 
particular personal relationships have special reasons to take each 
other’s reasons into account.  So  the exchange I’ve just  described 
takes  place  against  a background  agreement that the parties in- 
volved will take each other’s reasons into account.  The egoist is 
someone who only acts on his own reasons, not someone who has 
no concern  for others.  So  you  and your  student reason  together 
because you have tacitly agreed to, but this does not show that this 
is what usually happens. 
But the objection reemerges within this framework.  How are 
we to understand  this personal  relationship?  If  reasons are still 
private then it goes like this: each of you has a private reason to 
take the reasons of  the other into account.  A personal relationship 
is an interest in one another’s   interests.25  This doesn’t change the 
shape of the deliberation  -  you still back into your private de- 
liberative spaces and then reemerge to announce the results.  This 
only shows why you think there’s a point in the exercise at all, why 
you hope to reach a convergence.  But if  you are really reasoning 
together, if  you have joined your wills to arrive at a single deci- 
sion -well, then that can happen, can’t it? And why shouldn’t 
it be what usually happens?  Why shouldn’t language force us to 
reason practically together, in just the same way that it forces us to 
think together ? 
I believe that the myth of  egoism will die with the myth of  the 
privacy of  consciousness.  Now you  may  object  that the way in 
which  I  have  argued  against  the privacy of  consciousness -  by 
arguing that we can think and reason together -  has nothing to 
do with what philosophers mean when they discuss that privacy. 
What they mean by  privacy is that you  don’t always know what 
someone else is thinking or feeling.  The way in which you have 
access to the contents of  another person’s mind -  through words 
and expressions and other such forms of  evidence -  doesn’t allow 
27 And that’s not what a personal relationship is.  See note 7 of  this lecture. [KORSGAARD] The Sources of  Normativity  101 
you  to  look  around in  it freely,  and  make sure that you  know 
what’s there and what’s not. 
But that’s not an issue about privacy.  If  you accept the thesis 
that  consciousness is  reflective rather  than  internally  luminous, 
then you must admit that you don’t have access to your own mind 
in that way.  So that doesn’t mark a difference between the kind of 
relationship  you  have to yourself  and the kind that you have to 
other people.  All we’ve got here is a matter of  degree. You know 
some people  better  than others; if  you’re honest and lucky, you 
know yourself pretty well. 
Human beings are social animals in a deep way.  It is not just 
that we go in for friendship or prefer to live in swarms or packs. 
The space of  linguistic consciousness -  the space in which mean- 
ings and reasons exist -  is a space that we occupy together. 
The Origin of  Value and the Value of  Life 
Pain is an objection.  Interestingly, it is an objection to several 
of  the views that I have discussed here.  First, for many, pain is the 
biggest  stumbling block to accepting Wittgenstein’s views about 
our mental lives.  It seems to them that pain is a sensation and that 
it is in the mind and therefore that what it is to be in pain is to 
have a sensation in your  mind.  And it seems to them that there 
could be  a pain that was private in just the sense that Wittgen- 
stein denied.  Second, for many, pain is the biggest temptation to 
some form of  naturalistic realism about normativity.  One can have 
doubts about pleasure, for there are pleasures we deplore, but pain 
seems obviously to be a normative fact.  And, third, if  that is so, 
pain is an objection to Kantian ethics, or to any ethics that makes 
the  value  of  humanity  the foundation  of  value.  For  the  other 
animals suffer pain, and if  pain is intrinsically normative, then it 
matters  that  they  do.  Animals  just  as  such  should  have  moral 
standing. 
The first two objections are related.  Wittgenstein’s argument 
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against any form of  normative  naturalism -  that you  cannot be 
wrong.  Hobbes said you could only be obligated by the law if  the 
sovereign is able to punish you.  But if  you break the law and get 
away with it, then the sovereign was not after all able to punish 
you  and so  you  were not wrong.  Hume says that your reason  is 
your strongest desire.  But if  you  always act from your strongest 
desire, then you always do what you have reason  to do, and you 
cannot be wrong.  Wittgenstein  says that if  a word just refers to 
the very sensation that makes you feel like saying that word, then 
you cannot be wrong. 
But  both  the  opponent  of  Wittgenstein  and  the  normative 
realist point  to pain,  and more generally to sensation, as a case 
where it seems to be no objection to say that we cannot be wrong. 
In fact it creates a foundation. The utilitarian claims that pleasure 
and pain are facts that are also values, a place where the natural 
and the normative are one, and so where ethics can find a founda- 
tion in the world.  And this is exactly analogous to the epistemo- 
logical claim that our sensations are the place where the natural 
and the normative are one, and so where knowledge  can find a 
foundation  in the world.  Sensations  are seen to be  intrinsically 
normative entities, about which we cannot be wrong. 
But can’t we? “I cannot be wrong about whether I am seeing 
red.”  If  you mean that the object before you is red, you can cer- 
tainly be wrong.  “No, I mean that I am having a red sensation.” 
And what is that? It is the sensation that makes you feel like say- 
ing that a thing is red.  You are not describing  a condition that 
explains what you are inclined to say.  You are simply announcing 
what you are inclined to say.  In the same way, someone who says 
he is in pain is not describing a condition that gives him a reason 
to change his condition. He is announcing that he has a very strong 
impulse to change his condition. 
Now that way of  putting it, inspired  by Wittgenstein, has a 
problem.  People have thought that Wittgenstein  was making a 
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their own inner states and sensations they must be using language 
expressively, as if  “I am in pain” could only be a cry of pain, and 
you could not simply be reporting your condition.  Of  course you 
can report your condition; once you’ve mastered the language, you 
can  do anything that you  like.  His point is rather about mental 
activities, and whether a way of  talking leaves anything for them 
to be.  If  “I see something red” means “I am having a red sensa- 
tion” then one can never perceive; one can only announce the re- 
sults of  a perception that has already taken place.  For what is this 
“having”?  Did the little person  in your  mind perceive  the red 
sensation ? Wittgenstein is attacking a certain picture of what it is 
like to be conscious, which reduces all mental activity to the con- 
templation of sensations and ideas.  And the language of  “having” 
supports this picture.  Does “I am in pain” mean “I am having a 
horrible sensation” ? What here is the form of the “having” ? Are 
you  contemplating it? What would  be  so  horrible  about that? 
But  surely, you will  reply,  a physical pain is not just an im- 
pulse to change your condition.  It is a sensation of a certain char- 
acter.  Now I am not denying that when we are in pain part of 
what is going on is that we are having sensations of a certain char- 
acter.  I am however denying that the painfulness of  pain consists 
entirely in the character of  those sensations.  The painfulness of 
pain consists in the fact that these are sensations that we are in- 
clined to fight.  You may want to ask: why are we inclined to fight 
them if  they are not horrible in themselves? Well, in some cases 
we are biologically wired this way; pain could not do its biological 
job if  we were not inclined to fight it. When nature equipped us 
with pain she was giving us a way of  taking care of ourselves, not 
a reason to take care of  ourselves.  Why do you thrash? Is it as if 
you were trying to hurl your body away from itself? Why do you 
say  “as if”? Pain really is less horrible if  you can curb your in- 
clination to fight it.  This is why it helps, in dealing with pain, to 
take a tranquilizer or to lie down.  Ask yourself how, if  the pain- 
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could  help  to  lie  down?  The sensations  do  not  change.  Pain 
wouldn’t hurt if  you could just relax and enjoy it. 
If  the painfulness of  pain rested in the character of  the sensa- 
tions rather than in our tendency to revolt  against them, our be- 
lief that physical pain has something in common with grief, rage, 
and disappointment would be inexplicable.  For that matter, what 
physical pains have in common with  each other would  be inex- 
plicable, for the sensations are of  many different kinds.  What do 
nausea, migraine, menstrual cramps, pinpricks, and pinches have 
in common that makes us call them all pains?  What emotional 
pains have in common with physical ones is that in these cases too 
we are in the grip of  an overwhelming urge to do battle, not now 
against our sensations, but against the world.  Stoics and Buddhists 
are right in thinking that we could put an end to pain if  we could 
just stop fighting.  The person who cared only for his own virtue, 
if  there  could  be  such  a person, would  be happy on the  rack.28 
They  are wrong if  they conclude  that we should therefore stop 
fighting.  Many  pains  are worth  having; one may  even  say  that 
they are true.  Pain is not the condition that is a reason to change 
your condition, the condition in which the natural and the norma- 
tive are one.  It is our perception that we have a reason to change 
our condition.”  Pain itself  is not a reason at all. 
Of course there could not be such a person, or at least, he could not have the 
virtues  that were  the  only  things he cared  about.  To have  the virtues is in part to 
care about certain external things. 
29 When you feel pity for someone, why does it strike you as a reason to help 
him?  Why don’t you just  take  a tranquilizer?  Hutcheson  says, “If  our sole Inten- 
tion, in Compassion or Pity, was the Removal of  our Pain, we should run away, shut 
our Eyes, divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, to avoid the Pain of  Com- 
passion, which we seldom do . . .” (this passage is not in Raphael; one may find it 
in Selby-Bigge, British Moralists,  p. 93). The point is reiterated by Nagel: “Sym- 
pathy is not, in general, just  a feeling of  discomfort produced by  the recognition of 
‘distress in others, which in turn motivates  one to relieve their distress,  Rather,  it is 
the pained awareness of their distress as something to be relieved’ (The Possibility 
of Altruism,  p. 80n). Wittgenstein says, “How am I filled with pity for this man? 
How does it come out what the object of  my pity is?  (Pity, one may say, is a form 
of conviction that someone else is in pain)” (Philosophical Investigations §287, 
p. 98). Pity is painful because it is the perception of another’s pain, and so the 
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But  pain  is  the perception  of  a  reason.  Since animals  have 
pain,  and until now  I  have  seemed  to suggest that only human 
beings have reasons, this will take a moment to explain. 
The best account of  what an animal is comes from Aristotle. 
We have already seen that Aristotle  thought that the form of  a 
thing is the organization or arrangement of  its parts that allows it 
to be what it is, to do what it does, to do its job.  Now Aristotle 
thought that a living thing is a thing with a special kind of  form. 
A living thing is so designed as to maintain and reproduce itself. 
It has what we might call a self-maintaining form. So it is its own 
end; its job is just to keep on being what it is.  Its business in life 
is  to preserve its own identity.  And its organs and activities are 
arranged to that end.30 
If a living thing is an animal, if  it is conscious, then part of the 
way  it preserves  its own identity  is  through  its sensations.  And 
this is where pain comes  in.  When something is  a threat to its 
physical existence, or would be if it went on long enough, the ani- 
mal perceives that fact and revolts against it. The animal is moved 
to take action to fix what is wrong.  Suppose for instance that the 
animal needs nourishment.  It perceives that by getting hungry.  It 
finds this unpleasant and is moved to get something to eat. Don’t 
be confused here: it is not that the pain is an unpleasant sensation 
that gives the animal a reason to eat.  The animal has a reason to 
eat, which is that it will die if  it does not.  It does not know that it 
has that reason, but it does perceive it.  The sensation in question 
is the sensation of hunger, not of pain.  But an animal is designed 
to  perceive  and revolt  against  threats to  the preservation  of  its 
identity, such as hunger.  When it does that, it is in pain. 
Now consider  this comparison.  A human being is an animal 
whose nature it is to construct a practical identity that is normative 
for her.  She is a law to herself.  When some way of  acting is a 
threat to her practical identity and reflection reveals that fact, the 
30This account of the nature of an animal is based primarily on  On the Soul, 
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person  finds  that she must reject  that way of  acting, and act in 
another way.  In that case, she is obligated. 
A living thing is an entity whose nature it is to preserve and 
maintain its physical identity.  It is a law to itself.  When some- 
thing it is doing is a threat to that identity and perception reveals 
that fact, the animal finds that it must reject what it is doing and 
do something else instead.  In that case, it is in pain. 
Obligation is the reflective rejection of a threat to your identity. 
Pain is the unreflective rejection of a threat to your identity. So pain 
is the perception of  a reason, and that is why it seems normative. 
To say that life is a value is almost a tautology.  Since a living 
thing is a thing for which  the preservation of  identity is impera- 
tive, life is a form of morality.  Or to put the point less strangely 
and in a way that has been made more familiar to us by  Aristotle, 
morality is just the form that human life takes. 
From here the argument proceeds as it did in the case of  other 
people.  I won’t spell out the details here.  Roughly it will look 
like this: I first point out to you that your animal nature is a funda- 
mental form of  identity on which  your human identity depends. 
A further stretch of reflection requires a further stretch of endorse- 
ment.  If  you don’t value your animal nature, you can value noth- 
ing.  So you must endorse its value.  Perhaps that by itself  doesn’t 
show us that we have obligations to the other animals, since the 
value could still be private.  To show us that we have obligations, 
animals must have a way of  impressing their value upon us, the 
way we impress our value on each other when we ask, “How would 
you like it if  someone did that to you?” They must be able to in- 
trude into our consciousness and make us think. 
But that isn’t a problem, is it? The cries of an animal are no 
more mere noise than the words of a person.  An animal’s cries ex- 
press pain, and they mean that there is a reason to change its con- 
dition.  Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way 
another person can.  It is a way of  being someone that you share. 
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Conclusion 
I hope by  now it is clear that all of the accounts of  normativity 
that I have discussed in these lectures are true. 
Voluntarists like Pufendorf and Hobbes held that normativity 
must spring from the commands of a legislator.  A good legislator 
commands us  to do only what it is in any case a good idea to do, 
but the bare  fact that an action  is a good idea cannot make it a 
requirement. For that, it must be made law by someone in a posi- 
tion to command us. 
As we saw, that view is true, What it describes is the relation 
in which we stand to ourselves.  The fact that we must act in the 
light of reflection gives us a double nature.  The thinking self has 
the power to command the acting self, and it is only its command 
that can make action obligatory.  A good thinking self commands 
the acting self only to do what is good, but the acting self must in 
any case do what it says. 
Realists like Nagel think that reasons are intrinsically norma- 
tive  entities and that what we should do when a desire presents 
itself  is to look at it more objectively, to see whether it is such an 
entity.  This view is also true.  What it describes is the activity of 
the thinking self as it assesses the impulses that present themselves 
to us, the legislative proposals of our nature. 
Reflection has the power to compel obedience and to punish us 
for disobedience.  It in turn is bound to govern us by laws that are 
good.  Together these facts yield the conclusion that the relation 
of  the thinking self to the acting self is the relation of  legitimate 
authority. That is to say, the necessity of  acting in the light of re- 
flection makes us  authorities over  ourselves.  And insofar  as we 
have authority over ourselves, we can make laws for ourselves, and 
those laws will be normative.  So Kant’s view is also true.  Auton- 
omy is the source of obligation. 
Once we see this, we can see that the reflective endorsement 
theory is true on another level as well.  In the end, nothing can be 
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value upon ourselves.  Reflection reveals to us that the normativity 
of our values springs from the fact that we are animals of a certain 
kind, autonomous moral animals. That is, in the Aristotelian sense, 
our human form.  If  we do not place a value on being such ani- 
mals, then nothing will be normative at all. 
That means realism is true on another level too.  To see this, 
recall once again John Mackie’s famous “argument from queer- 
ness.”  31  According to  Mackie,  it is fantastic to think that the 
world contains objective values or intrinsically normative entities. 
For in order to do what values do, they would have to be entities 
of a very strange sort, utterly unlike anything else in the universe. 
The way that we know them would have to be different from the 
way  that we know  ordinary  facts.  Knowledge of  them, Mackie 
says, would have to provide the knower with both a direction and 
a  motive.  For  when  you  met  an  objective  value,  according  to 
Mackie,  it would  have  to  be -  and I’m nearly  quoting now - 
able  both  to tell you  what to do and to make you  do it.  And 
nothing is like that. 
But Mackie is wrong and realism is right.  Of course there are 
entities that meet these criteria.  It’s true that they are queer sorts 
of  entities  and that knowing them  isn’t like anything else.  But 
that doesn’t mean that they  don’t exist.  John Mackie must have 
been  alone in his room with the Scientific World View when he 
wrote those words.  For it is the most familiar fact of  human life 
that the world  contains entities that can tell us what to do and 
make us do it.  They are people, and the other animals.32 
31 See “Realism” in Lecture I, 
32 I would like to thank Charlotte Brown, Peter Hylton, Arthur Kuflik, Andrews 
Reath, Amelie Rorty, Thomas Scanlon, Jay  Schleusener, and my  commentators on the 
occasion of  the lectures  (listed below)  for comments on earlier versions of  these lec- 
tures.  A longer version of  the lectures, together with commentary by  Gerald Cohen, 
Raymond  Geuss, Thomas  Nagel,  and Bernard Williams, is forthcoming from Cam- 
bridge University Press. [KORSGAARD] The Sources of Normativity 1 09 
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